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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Priority No. 2 
v. : 
DIANE MARIE NELSON, : Case No. 970163-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(j)(1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly determine that the victim's eyewitness 
testimony was constitutionally reliable and thus admissible? 
A trial court's decision to admit eyewitness identification evidence is a 
question of law that is reviewed under a correctness standard. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774, 782 n. 3 (Utah 1991); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 (Utah 1993). This 
"correctness review necessarily incorporates a review of the trial court's resolution of 
factual questions and the associated determination of credibility that may underlie the 
decision to admit." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782 n. 3, 778. Such subsidiary findings will be 
overturned only if clearly erroneous. Id. Here, the facts below were uncontroverted, 
consequently there are no factual questions for review. 
2. Is the evidence sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that 
defendant acted as an accomplice to the aggravated robbery? 
In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, this Court views the evidence and 
the inferences from it in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Strain, 885 
P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994). The Court may reverse for insufficient evidence "only 
when the evidence is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime." Id. 
(citation omitted). See also State v. Dunn 850 P.2d, 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993). However, 
defendant's claim of insufficient evidence is either waived or constitutes invited error 
because she conceded below that the victim's testimony, if believed, was sufficient to 
establish all the elements of aggravated robbery. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions are 
contained in addendum F. 
a 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charge 
Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995). 
Threshold Eyewitness Reliability Determination 
Defendant moved to suppress the victim's eyewitness identification 
testimony claiming that it was unreliable under the federal and state constitutions (R. 17) 
(a copy is attached as addendum A). The State filed a memorandum in opposition to 
defendant's motion, setting forth the relevant facts and arguing the admissibility of the 
eyewitness testimony under criteria set forth in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 
1991) (R.33-44) (a copy is attached as addendum B). 
As the facts were uncontroverted, a non-evidentiary hearing was held (R. 
162-69) (a copy of the suppression transcript is attached as addendum C). Defendant was 
prepared to call an expert, who had reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript, to testify 
about the different factors impacting the eye witness identification, including "the 
darkness, the shortness of the period of time,.. . the cross-cultural issue,... [and the] 
show-up procedure, where [defendant] was handcuffed in front of a patrol car" (R. 162, 
169, see addendum C). The trial court, observing that there was nothing "highly unusual" 
about the victim's eyewitness identification testimony in this case, declined to hear the 
defendant's expert (R. 162, see addendum C). Rather, the trial court denied defendant's 
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motion and admitted the eyewitness identification evidence, further ruling that both 
parties were entitled to call experts to testify concerning the weight jurors should accord 
the eyewitness testimony under Ramirez, and that the jury would be instructed regarding 
those factors under State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986) (R. 162, 169, see 
addendum C). 
Jury Instructions 
The trial court rejected proposed instructions from both defendant and the 
prosecutor concerning the unsupported theory that defendant's conduct did not amount to 
aggravated robbery. Defendant requested to instruct the jury that "where there are two 
possible explanations for the conduct of the defendant, and by one explanation the 
defendant would not be responsible, then the prosecution has failed to make out a case 
against the defendant and he (sic) must be acquitted" (R. 86 (proposed instruction), R. 
370, a copy of the conference on jury instructions is attached as addendum D). The trial 
court rejected the instruction, observing that defendant's theory was misidentification, not 
reduced culpability; therefore, there were not two possible explanations for defendant's 
conduct (R. 370-71, see addendum D). Trial counsel agreed, stating: "I think you're 
correct. Our primary argument is the identification procedures" (id). The trial court 
accordingly declined to give the requested instruction (id.). 
The trial court also rejected the State's request to instruct the jury on the 
lesser included offense of robbery (R. 366-67, see addendum D). The State was 
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concerned that the jury might find the knife was not a dangerous weapon (id). Defendant 
opposed the lesser included instruction (R. 373-74, see addendum D). 
The trial court reiterated that the case turned on the victim's eyewitness 
testimony, and that there was no theory of the case that defendant committed simple 
robbery: "[I]f they find the witnesses credible enough to convict, then the testimony had 
to do with a weapon, and it becomes ag (sic) robbery" (R. 374, see addendum D). 
The prosecutor expressed an additional concern that the jury would find 
defendant did not intend that her cohort use a knife, but that she did intend to commit a 
robbery (id.). On that ground, the prosecutor argued that both an aggravated robbery and 
a simple robbery instruction were appropriate (id.). 
The trial court remained disinclined to the give the lesser included 
instruction, observing that the knife constituted the only evidence of threatening conduct 
for purposes of robbery and aggravated robbery (R. 375, see addendum D). The 
prosecutor disagreed, and reiterated his concern that "the jury could find that she intended 
for him to get the shoes, but exceeded, basically, her authority or agency by using the 
knife" (R. 376-77, see addendum D). 
Turning to defendant's trial counsel, the trial court inquired if he planned to 
make that argument and indicated that in her view it would be inappropriate: 
It doesn't matter what [defendant] intended. She intended to 
have him get [the shoes] for her, and then he engages in this 
conduct. She has solicited, encouraged it. She doesn't need 
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to know he's going to pull out a knife. She merely needs to 
be present for it and to have solicited it or encouraged it or 
aided and assisted in any other way. 
(R. 377-78, see addendum D). 
The prosecutor interjected that he was concerned that it was unclear to the 
jury that the mental state did not go to the use of a specific weapon, but rather to the 
commission of the crime (R. 378, see addendum D). The trial court told the prosecutor 
that it was his responsibility to make that argument and that she was still disinclined to 
give the lesser included instruction (id.). 
Turning again to trial counsel, the trial court cautioned him against arguing 
that defendant's conduct did not amount to aggravated robbery on the ground that he had 
no evidence to support the argument (id.). Trial counsel responded that he had not made 
that argument in his opening statement (id.). The trial court asked trial counsel to clarify 
his argument and he responded as follows: 
Well, we said it in opening, that it's an interesting case, and 
even if you look at the conduct, and the question, is, is the 
conduct even a crime? Which is what we had already argued. 
The conduct is a crime, if the jury finds the witness is 
credible, it is a crime to take somebody's shoes, or threaten to 
take them at knife point. And even if she isn V the one with the 
knife, if they find she was the one there soliciting, 
encouraging the conduct, then it's aggravated robbery under 
the elements. 
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(R. 378-79, see addendum D) (emphasis added). Based on trial counsel's concession, that 
if the jury believed the victim's testimony, the evidence was sufficient to convict 
defendant for aggravated robbery, the trial court declined to instruct the jury on the lesser 
included offense of robbery (R. 379, see addendum D). The trial court indicated that she 
would monitor trial counsel to make sure he did not "walk over the line" (id.). 
Conviction 
Following a one-day trial held on 4 November 1996, the jury convicted 
defendant as charged (R. 124, 128). 
Sentence 
The trial court imposed a five-to-life term of imprisonment and a $10,000 
fine which sentence was stayed and a three year probationary term imposed (R. 138). 
Appeal 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme Court (R. 
140). The case was poured over to this Court on 24 February 1997 (R. 156). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Just as it was getting dark on the evening of 1 July 1996, Amy Brown 
parked her truck in the vicinity of 300 West and 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, and 
began walking to her apartment a "few feet" away (R. 310-16). Defendant and two male 
cohorts were standing by some dumpsters in the southeast area of the apartment complex, 
five to six feet away from Ms. Brown (R. 312). As Ms. Brown approached, defendant 
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commented on her shoes, stating, "Nice shoes," and "I like your shoes" (R. 312). Ms. 
Brown looked at defendant "out of the corner of her eye," but otherwise ignored 
defendant's comment and continued walking west toward her apartment (R. 313-14, 326). 
When Ms. Brown was within three to four feet of the trio, defendant turned to one of her 
cohorts stating, "I like her shoes," and then in a more demanding tone, defendant 
commanded her cohort to "Get them for me" (R. 314-15). Defendant's cohort 
immediately pulled an 18" knife from behind his back and pointing it at Ms. Brown, 
stated, "Give her the shoes" (R. 314-16, 329). Chased after by defendant's cohort, Ms. 
Brown ran to her apartment and called 911 (R. 302, 316). Police dispatch received Ms. 
Brown's call at 9:53 p.m. (R. 336). Ms. Brown estimated that the entire incident lasted 
approximately 30 seconds (R. 328). 
Although it was after dark, the dumpster area was sufficiently lighted that 
Ms. Brown had no difficulty seeing the three cohorts prior to the attack (R. 313, 332). 
Ms. Brown, who is Caucasian, observed that defendant was a Black female, had short, 
curly hair, and was nicely dressed in pants and a shirt (R. 314). Other than defendant, 
her two white male accomplices, and Ms. Brown, there were no other people in the area 
(R.313). 
Shortly after 10:00 p.m., police arrived to investigate the incident (R. 302, 
336). Based on Ms. Brown's descriptions of her assailants, Officer DeGraw detained 
defendant, whom he had observed hanging around on 300 South, near the dumpsters, 
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when he arrived (R. 337, 340-43). Officer DeGraw had no difficulty seeing defendant 
who was standing on the edge of the street in a "more well lit area" (R. 338). He 
observed no other people in the vicinity (R. 337). Police apprehended defendant a short 
while later as she came out of an alley north of the dumpsters (R. 342). 
Within 30 minutes of the aggravated robbery, police told Ms. Brown that 
they had "somebody" that she "might want to come and look at" (R. 320). A flashlight 
was shown on defendant's face while she was handcuffed, standing next to a patrol car 
(R. 321, 331). From a distance of 15 feet, Ms. Brown immediately recognized defendant, 
by her hair, face and clothing, as the woman who had earlier demanded her shoes (R. 
321).1 
As Officer DeGraw transported her to jail, defendant stated, "I didn't do 
anything. I didn't do anything. Maybe Cody or Brad did something, but I didn't do 
anything" (R. 345). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The facts surrounding Ms. Brown's eyewitness identification of defendant 
were not controverted below. Rather, defendant focused primarily on the weight to be 
accorded Ms. Brown's testimony under factors discussed in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
1
 Police also asked Ms. Brown to identify a white male suspect fitting her 
description of defendant's cohort, but Ms. Brown determined that he was not one of 
defendant's accomplices (R. 344-45). 
9 
774 (Utah 1991). Therefore, defendant's claims of unresolved factual disputes are 
waived. 
Even if the Court considers the merits of defendant's claim, it is 
unreasonable, on this record, to leap to the conclusion that the trial court abandoned its 
gatekeeping responsibilities under Ramirez because it did not enter findings in support of 
its admissibility ruling. The facts were uncontroverted below, the parties and the trial 
court were aware of and focused on Ramirez' requirement of a threshold admissibility 
ruling, and the trial court ultimately ruled that the eyewitness testimony was admissible. 
The record is thus adequate for this Court to perform its appellate review function. While 
it is always preferable for trial courts considering the reliability of eyewitness testimony 
to enter formal Ramirez findings, even on uncontroverted facts, the failure to do so here 
does not constitute reversible error. Rather, it is reasonable to find facts in support of the 
admissibility ruling; therefore, the Court should affirm the decision below. 
Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is at bottom, an 
unpreserved claim of statutory interpretation and instructional error. Because defendant 
failed to raise these issues below and even assured the trial court that the victim's 
testimony was adequate, if credible, to establish the elements of aggravated robbery, 
defendant's sufficiency claim is waived or amounts to invited error and should be 
rejected. 
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Even if the Court deems defendant to have raised a valid sufficiency claim, 
the claim should still be rejected because defendant fails to properly marshal the evidence 
supporting the jury verdict and to demonstrate its insufficiency. In claiming a paucity of 
the evidence, defendant draws only those inference favorable to her claims of 
insufficiency and wholly ignores those reasonable inferences that support the jury's 
verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FACTS SURROUNDING THE EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION WERE UNCONTROVERTED 
BELOW; THEREFORE, DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS OF 
UNRESOLVED FACTUAL DISPUTES ARE WAIVED 
AND THE COURT SHOULD ASSUME THAT THE 
FACTS SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
THRESHOLD ADMISSIBILITY RULING 
A. Waiver 
Defendant complains that the trial court failed to make a threshold 
determination of the constitutional reliability of Ms. Brown's eyewitness testimony as 
required by State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). Br. of Aplt. at 10. She bases her 
claim on the absence of factual findings in support of the trial court's admissibility ruling. 
Br. of Aplt. at 13-15. However, defendant made no request for Ramirez findings below, 
and, as the facts were uncontroverted, there was no necessity that factual findings be 
entered here. Indeed, defendant did not controvert the facts in her motion to suppress (R. 
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17, see addendum A), or at the non-evidentiary hearing (R. 161-69, see addendum C). 
Defendant focused instead on proffered expert testimony challenging the reliability of the 
victim's identification of defendant on the uncontroverted facts (id.). Accordingly, 
defendant's complaints about the lack of Ramirez findings and unresolved factual 
disputes are waived. State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994) (declining to hear 
state due process claim under Ramirez "that [was] not raised at trial."); State v. Olsen, 860 
P.2d 332 (Utah 1993) (finding defendant waived state due process claim by failing to 
object when trial court admitted eyewitness identification evidence without first holding 
evidentiary hearing). 
B. Ramirez Assumption Applies 
Even if this Court considers the merits of defendant's claim, under the 
circumstances of this case, it is unreasonable to leap to the conclusion that the trial court 
abandoned its gatekeeping responsibilities under Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778, in 
determining to admit the eyewitness testimony. At the time of its admissibility ruling on 
9 October 1996, the trial court had before it the State's memorandum setting forth the 
relevant facts and discussing the admissibility of the eyewitness evidence under Ramirez 
(R. 33-44, see addendum B). As the facts were uncontroverted, the only issue for 
resolution was a legal one: the threshold, constitutional admissibility of the eyewitness 
identification mandated in Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 778. Ramirez itself recognizes that it 
will not be necessary for the trial court to make findings in all cases, particularly where 
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there is no conflicting testimony. 817 P.2d at 778 (prosecution "must lay a foundation 
upon which the trial court can make any necessary preliminary factual findings and reach 
any necessary legal conclusions"), and 782 n.3 ("the trial judge may have to weigh 
conflicting testimony as to the circumstances surrounding the confession or 
identification") (emphasis added). The Supreme Court further held in Ramirez, that in the 
absence of factual findings on necessary factual issues, the reviewing court should 
"assume that the trier of facts found them in accord with its decision," and "affirm the 
decision if from the evidence it would be reasonable to find facts to support it." 817 P.2d 
at 787. It is reasonable to apply the Ramirez assumption in this case. 
Although, the Supreme Court has identified three instances when the 
Ramirez assumption cannot be made, these instances are not triggered here. State v. 
Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1234 (Utah 1997). Specifically, the Ramirez assumption does 
not apply 
when an ambiguity of the facts makes the assumption 
unreasonable, if the statute explicitly provides that written 
findings must be made, or when a prior cases states that 
findings on a particular issue must be made to impress upon 
the trial court the importance of the issue so as to ensure that 
we can properly perform our appellate review function. 
State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1234 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). No statute 
explicitly provides that findings be made in this instance and, for reasons set forth below, 
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defendant fails to show that either of the other two Robertson exceptions to the Ramirez 
assumption apply here. 
This is not a case where an ambiguity of the facts makes the Ramirez 
assumption unreasonable. Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1224. Even if the Court deems 
defendant's claims to be properly before it, defendant points to no facts or circumstances 
that undermine the trial court's threshold admissibility ruling. Defendant claims that the 
"most troubling conflict" concerns the fact whether defendant was handcuffed at the time 
of the showup. Br. of Aplt. at 18. Ms. Brown and her husband both testified that 
defendant was handcuffed, while Officer DeGraw testified that she was not; therefore, the 
weight of the evidence suggests that defendant was handcuffed at the time of the 
identification (R. 303, 321, 354). Under Ramirez, this fact does not render Ms. Brown's 
testimony constitutionally unreliable. The Ramirez robber was similarly handcuffed, yet 
the eyewitness testimony in that case was deemed properly admitted. 817 P.2d at 784. 
Defendant's further complaints about alleged conflicts between the 
witnesses' descriptions of the lighting conditions are unsupported in the record. All three 
witnesses, Ms. Brown, her husband and Officer DeGraw, agreed that it was dark, but that 
there was lighting in vicinity of the dumpsters (R. 294-95, 332-333, 338). Specifically, 
Ms. Brown testified that it was lighter in the dumpster area than the surrounding areas and 
that it was sufficiently light for her to see her assailants (R. 332). Ms. Brown's husband 
viewed the area shortly after the incident and indicated only that there were street lights in 
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the alley leading to 300 South, but that there were no street lights on 300 South itself (R. 
294). He further indicated that the dumpsters were located "down the alley way towards 
[300] South" (R. 294-95). Officer DeGraw testified that the dumpster area was not well 
lit, but that "there are a few street lights that make it possible to see the people in the area 
and stuff9 (R. 338). Consequently, neither Mr. Brown's nor Officer DeGraw's testimony 
is inconsistent with Ms. Brown's testimony that it was lighter in the area of the 
dumpsters, and/or that the dumpster area was sufficiently lighted for her to see defendant 
(R. 332-33). 
To the extent the witnesses' descriptions of the lighting conditions do vary, 
those variances bear on their credibility and on the weight jurors could accord their 
testimony, but they do not render Ms. Brown's testimony constitutionally unreliable. 
State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648 (Utah App. 1992) (holding that differences between 
witnesses original description of suspect and defendant's actual appearance bear on 
witness credibility and on weight accorded that testimony, but does not render 
identification inadmissible), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). This is true also of 
defendant's complaints that Ms. Brown did not get a long enough look at defendant, that 
she paid more attention to the male accomplices, that the drawn knife became the focus of 
her attention, that she was hysterical after the incident and upon identifying defendant, 
that she overestimated defendant's height, that she had trouble remembering what 
defendant wore in her preliminary hearing testimony, and that she is Caucasian and that 
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defendant is Black. These are all considerations for the jury in deciding what weight to 
accord Ms. Brown's testimony. Id. They do not, either individually or together, render 
her testimony inadmissible. Id. Defendant thus fails to show any ambiguity in the facts 
that would make application of the Ramirez assumption unreasonable. 
It is a closer question whether application of the Ramirez assumption is 
appropriate under the third instance noted in Robertson, when a prior case requires 
findings "to impress upon the trial court the importance of the issue so as to ensure that 
[the reviewing court] can properly perform [its] appellate review function." 932 P.2d 
1234. Robertson lists two examples of such cases, both requiring trial courts to enter 
findings and conclusions regarding the admission of hearsay testimony of child sex abuse 
victims. 932 P.2d at 1225 (citing State v. Eldredge, 713 P.2d 29, 34 (Utah) (holding that 
after consideration of all statutory and other relevant factors, "the court must make 
written findings and conclusions with respect to each factor"), cert denied, 493 U.S. 814 
(1989); and State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1355 n.3 (Utah 1986) (holding that trial court 
"should" enter findings and conclusions regarding statutory factors to explain its 
reasoning for admitting or excluding testimony)). Notably, although Ramirez strongly 
cautions trial courts against "sidestepping" their responsibility to perform the required 
constitutional admissibility analysis, id. at 778, Robertson does not list Ramirez as a case 
requiring findings and conclusions in all instances. 932 P.2d at 1225. As noted 
previously, Ramirez requires findings only when necessary, or when there is conflicting 
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testimony. 817 P.2d 778, 782 n.3. While it is always preferable for trial courts 
considering the reliability of eyewitness testimony to enter formal Ramirez findings, even 
on uncontroverted facts, the failure to do so here does not amount to reversible error. The 
record is adequate for this Court to properly perform its appellate review function. 
Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1225. 
C. Ramirez Analysis Supports Admissibility Ruling 
As recognized by the trial court, there is nothing "highly unusual" about the 
facts of the eyewitness identification in this case (R. 162, see addendum C). Review of 
the Ramirez factors supports the trial court's observation. The first Ramirez factor takes 
into account the eyewitnesses opportunity to view the suspect. Id. at 782. The Ramirez 
robber was masked, crouched down, and viewed from ten to thirty feet away, id.; 
defendant was unmasked, standing sufficiently erect as to get some idea of her height, and 
was viewed from as close as three to four feet and only as far away as five to six feet (R. 
313-15). Although Ms. Brown looked at defendant out of the comer of her eye, nothing 
in the record indicates that she was unable to see defendant's full face (R. 326). The 
Ramirez eyewitness, on the other hand, only saw a portion of the robber's masked face. 
Ramirez at 784. The fact that defendant's accomplice thereafter chased Ms. Brown does 
not detract from her initial view of defendant, even if that view lasted a few seconds. See 
State v. WilletU 909 P.2d 218, 220, 224 (Utah 1995) (finding eyewitness' "few seconds" 
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observation of defendant "sufficiently reliable" to be admitted). Moreover, there were no 
distracting noises or activity at the time. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782. 
Ms. Brown's degree of attention to, and capacity to observe defendant were 
also sufficient for purposes of the second and third Ramirez factors. Ms. Brown's 
attention was drawn to defendant immediately upon hearing defendant speak to her (R. 
326). She wanted to and did look at defendant as the individual who had commented on 
her shoes (id). Although Ms. Brown experienced stress prior to, and fright during the 
incident, nothing in the record suggests that she was hindered in her ability to see 
defendant clearly (R. 333). Identification of the Ramirez robber, on the other hand, was 
hindered by the fact that his accomplice was assaulting the eyewitness with a pipe during 
the robbery, 817 P.2d 783. Here, Ms. Brown looked at defendant before she was assailed 
by defendant's knife-wielding accomplice (R. 326-27). The record is further devoid of 
indication that Ms. Brown acted under any personal motivation, bias, or prejudice, or that 
her vision was poor, or that she was impaired by fatigue, injury, drugs or alcohol. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783. 
The fourth Ramirez factor takes into account the spontaneity and 
consistency of the eyewitness identification. Id. Ms. Brown identified defendant a mere 
30 minutes after the incident and her identification has remained consistent since that 
time (R. 312). See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783 (noting that elapsed time of 30 minutes to an 
hour between crime and witness identification was minimal). It is not unusual that Ms. 
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Brown was agitated or frightened by the aggravated robbery; importantly, the record 
gives no indication that her mental capacity and state of mind inhibited her ability to 
correctly identify defendant and/or her cohorts (R. 333). Ms. Brown also looked at a 
male suspect, but determined that he was not one of defendant's cohorts (R. 344-45). As 
noted previously, Ms. Brown overestimated defendant's height, but that discrepancy goes 
to the weight of her testimony, and not its threshold admissibility. Mincy, 838 P.2d at 
658. 
The final and most critical Ramirez factor concerns the suggestibility of the 
showup itself. Like the showup in Ramirez, the instant showup was likely, "blatantly 
suggestive." 817 P.2d at 784. Both suspects were identified in handcuffs, at night on a 
city street, in close proximity to police officers. Compare id and (R. 321, 331). Despite 
these problems in Ramirez, and acknowledging that they created "an extremely close 
case," the admission of the eyewitness identification testimony in that case was upheld. 
817 P.2d at 784. Because the circumstances surrounding Ms. Brown's eyewitness 
identification are no more problematic than those in Ramirez, the admission of her 
eyewitness identification testimony was proper and should be upheld. See also State v. 
Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1234, 1238 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (upholding admissibility of 
eyewitness identification despite blatantly suggestive showup where defendant was 
surrounded by officers and illuminated by patrol car headlights), cert, denied, P.2d 
, (Utah November 28,1995). 
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Based on the above, the record supports the trial court's admissibility 
determination. Defendant points to no undermining inadequacy. Therefore, the Court 
should apply the Ramirez assumption and uphold the admissibility ruling. 
POINT U 
DEFENDANT CONCEDED BELOW THAT, IF 
CREDIBLE, THE VICTIM'S TESTIMONY SUFFICED 
TO ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS OF AGGRAVATED 
ROBBERY; THEREFORE, HER CONTRARY CLAIM 
ON APPEAL IS EITHER WAIVED OR AMOUNTS TO 
INVITED ERROR 
Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction 
as an accomplice to the aggravated robbery. Significantly, defendant does not dispute 
that the evidence sufficiently established that an aggravated robbery took place, or that 
she was involved. Rather, defendant's sufficiency challenge rests on a theory of statutory 
construction. Defendant claims that the accomplice and aggravated robbery statutes 
imply a requirement that the State prove an accomplice has knowledge that the principal 
will use a dangerous weapon. Br. of Aplt. at 23. Based on this statutory interpretation, 
defendant argues that the State failed to introduce any evidence that she knew her cohort 
would draw a knife on the victim and therefore the evidence is insufficient. Br. of Aplt. 
at 25. However, defendant conceded below that the victim's testimony, if credible, 
sufficed to establish the elements of aggravated robbery. Her contrary claim on appeal is 
thus waived, or else amounts to invited error. 
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A. Waiver/Invited Error 
Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence do not require preservation; 
however, on appeal, defendants may not argue a factual or legal position contrary to that 
they asserted in the trial court. Rather, a sufficiency challenge directly attacks the 
reasonability of the jury's decision. An appellate court will reverse a conviction for lack 
of evidence only when the evidence and all reasonable inferences, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the verdict, uis sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that a jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt..." State v. 
James, 819 P.2d 781, 784-85 (Utah 1991). 
The reasonableness of the jury's verdict necessarily turns on whether the 
evidence satisfies the elements on which the trial court instructed them. In this case, the 
trial court instructed the jury in the statutory language. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
202 (1995) (accomplice liability); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995) (aggravated 
robbery); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (Supp. 1996) (robbery) (copies of the pertinent 
statutes are attached in addendum F), and (R. 105, 107-110) (copies of the elements 
instructions are attached as addendum E). Petitioner raised no objection and requested no 
clarifying instruction (R. 366-79, see addendum D).2 Defendant does not contend that the 
2
 The only objection defendant raised to jury instructions below was to the 
court's reasonable doubt instruction (R. 416). 
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evidence, viewed in light of the jury instructions given, insufficiently establishes her 
guilt. Br. of Aplt. at 23-26. 
Rather, the gravamen of defendant's claim is that the accomplice and 
aggravated robbery statutes require proof that an accomplice to aggravated robbery must 
know that the principal will use a weapon, and that the trial court should have so 
instructed the jury. However, petitioner never asked the trial court to consider the novel 
statutory interpretation she now asks this Court to impose; moreover, she raises no claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. Unlike a sufficiency claim, questions of statutory 
construction and/or instructional error are waived if not raised at trial. See, e.g., Utah R. 
Crim. P. 19(c); State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 651 n.2 (Utah App. 1996) (declining to hear 
sufficiency claim to the extent it incorporated unpreserved question of statutory 
construction), cert, denied, 937 P.2d 136 (Utah 1997). 
More importantly, in light of trial counsel's concession that the victim's 
testimony, if deemed credible by the jury, was sufficient to establish all the elements of 
aggravated robbery, defendant's claim constitutes invited error. As set out more fully in 
the Statement of Case, pp.5-8, supra, trial counsel assured the trial court that he would 
not argue defendant's reduced culpability based on the fact that her cohort, and not 
defendant, handled the weapon: 
The conduct is a crime, if the jury finds the witness is 
credible, it is a crime to take somebody's shoes, or threaten to 
take them at knife point. And even if she isn't the one with 
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the knife, if they find she was the one there soliciting, 
encouraging the conduct, then it's aggravated robbery under 
the elements. 
(R. 378-79, see addendum D). Defendant thus disclaimed below the exact theory he now 
posits in this Court. Defendant's theory below was misidentification, not reduced 
culpability (id). 
The policy undergirding the invited error doctrine is that the trial court 
"should have the first opportunity to address the claim of error," and that parties should 
be discouraged from intentionally misleading the trial court "so as to preserve a hidden 
ground for reversal on appeal." State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1108 (Utah 1996). 
Therefore, having lead the trial court to believe that the victim's testimony, if credible, 
was sufficient to establish the elements of aggravated robbery, and that her defense 
strategy was to therefore claim misidentification, defendant may not now take advantage 
of any consequent deficiency in the jury instructions. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 
1993) ("A party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led 
the trial court into committing the error."). 
B. Failure to Marshall 
Even if the Court deems defendant's claim to constitute a legitimate 
sufficiency challenge, defendant has not marshalled the evidence and shown that it is 
inadequate to support the jury's verdict. In order to establish a claim of insufficiency of 
the evidence, defendant must marshal all the evidence in support of the verdict and 
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demonstrate that, even viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is 
insufficient to support it. State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994); Dunn, 850 
P.2d at 1212. The Court may reverse for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so 
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for 
which she was convicted. Id. 
Defendant fails to meet this heavy burden. In claiming a paucity of the 
evidence to demonstrate that she knew her cohort would draw a knife on the victim, 
defendant draws only those inference favorable to her claims of insufficiency and wholly 
ignores those reasonable inferences that support the jury's verdict. Br. of Aplt. at 25-26. 
See West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). 
Moreover, defendant cites no Utah authority requiring the State to prove an accomplice's 
specific knowledge that the principal will use a weapon. Br. of Aplt. at 24. Indeed, there 
appears to be no such requirement. 
In State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052 (Utah 1985), the Supreme Court upheld 
Smith's aggravated robbery conviction on a theory of accomplice liability. Although this 
precise issue was not raised in Smith, the Supreme Court set forth the elements that had to 
be established and articulated no separate requirement that Smith, the driver of the get 
away car, had to have specific knowledge that weapons would be used. Id. at 1056. 
Rather, in order to convict Smith as an accomplice to the aggravated robbery in that case, 
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the State was required to prove only that "a deadly weapon, firearm, or facsimile of a 
firearm was used in the commission of the crime." Id. 
In the present case, the jury similarly had to conclude that defendant had the 
mental state required to commit a criminal offense and that she solicited, requested, 
commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided her knife-wielding cohort. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995). The evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom 
support the jury's verdict. Defendant admired Ms. Brown's shoes and consequently 
commanded one her two cohorts to "get" them for her (R. 314). Defendant's cohort 
immediately pulled an 18" inch from behind his back and demanded the shoes on 
defendant's behalf (R. 315). 
Admittedly, defendant did not expressly ask defendant to use the knife, or 
otherwise comment on its appearance. Nevertheless, the jury could reasonably conclude 
that defendant directed her cohort to get the shoes precisely because she knew that he, as 
opposed to her other male companion, had a weapon that could be used to effectuate her 
command. It is a further reasonable inference that if defendant had been surprised and/or 
alarmed by the knife's appearance, she would have demonstrated that surprise in some 
fashion, or attempted to prevent her cohort from threatening Ms. Brown with the knife. 
The record is devoid of any indication that she did so. Instead, defendant watched as her 
armed cohort chased Ms. Brown to her apartment. 
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Because defendant ignores the above reasonable inferences, she has failed 
to comply with the marshalling requirement, and this Court should not consider her 
sufficiency challenge. State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604, 607-08 (Utah App. 1994). 
Additionally, there is some evidence that defendant solicited the aggravated robbery with 
the mental state to commit an offense. As long as there is evidence, including these 
reasonable inferences, from which all of the requisite elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made, the Court should affirm the jury verdict. State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 
87 (Utah 1993) ("[w]e will affirm the jury verdict as long as there is some evidence, 
including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the 
crime can reasonably be made" (citation omitted)). 
This is simply not a case where defendant had the misfortune to be present 
while her cohort committed the aggravated robbery; indeed, defendant's command to 
"get" the shoes instigated the crime. Compare State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794, 797 (Utah 
1977) (holding that other officer-defendants not accomplice to defendant officer's 
evidence tampering where jury found that officers merely followed their superior's orders 
and did not know what he had planned); and State v. Gee, 498 P.2d 662, 665 (Utah 1972) 
(holding that two witnesses were not accomplices, and could therefore testify, where there 
was no evidence that they assisted in or were present during the crime). The evidence is 
not so inherently improbable that reasonable persons must have entertained a reasonable 
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doubt about defendant's participation, or in particular, defendant's knowledge that the 
knife would be and was used to get Ms. Brown's shoes. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the Court 
affirm defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS J_ day of August, 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General . 
IAN DECKER 
(ssistant Attorney General 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, DIVISION I 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
DIANE MARIE NELSON, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
Case No. 961901374FS 
JUDGE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
The defendant, DIANE MARIE NELSON, by and through counsel, RICHARD P. 
MAURO, moves the court to suppress statements of witnesses relating to 
their identification of Ms. Nelson and to suppress their in court 
identification of her. This motion is based on the grounds that the 
identification procedure was unreliable and unduly suggestive and taints 
any other identification of Defendant, in violation of due process under 
the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. 
Neil v. Biqqers. 409 U.S. 188 (1972). This motion is made on the further 
grounds that the unreliable and suggestive procedure violates Article I, §7 
of the Utah Constitution. State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). 
DATED this "^' day of August, 1996. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: 
RICHARD P URO 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the District Attorney's 
Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this £5 day of 
August, 1996. /^\ 
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Addendum B 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
ROGER BLAYLOCK, 0367 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
Plaintiff, ) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
v EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
-vs-
DIANE MARIE NELSON, Case No. 961901374FS 
Defendant. Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
The State of Utah, by and through its counsel, E. Neal Gunnarson, District Attorney for 
Salt Lake County, and Roger Blaylock, Deputy District Attorney, respectfully submits the 
following memorandum in opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress Identification. 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant moves this court to suppress evidence relating to the identification of her by the 
State's witness ("witness"). Defendant grounds her motion on the assertion that the police 
showup was impermissibly suggestive in violation of Defendant's state and federal due process 
rights. Defendant wholly fails to support this bare assertion with any analysis. 
The State respectfully requests that this Court deny Defendant's Motion because the 
police showup did not result in a very substantial likelihood that the witness misidentified the 
Defendant. Therefore, the witness1 identification of Defendant at the showup is admissible. 
AUG 29 19S6 
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Moreover, the totality of the circumstances proves that the witness* personal observations of 
Defendant provided a basis upon which to identify Defendant that is independent of the showup. 
Hence, the witness should be permitted to identify the Defendant in court even if this Court 
suppresses the showup. 
FACTS 
On July 1, 1996, at approximately 9:53 p.m., Salt Lake City Police Officers Boelter and 
Degraw were dispatched to the area of 300 South and 300 West in Salt Lake City to investigate a 
report of a suspicious person. When they arrived, the witness explained that as she was walking 
toward her apartment, a black female ("Defendant") accosted her and said, "Give me your shoes." 
The victim refused to surrender her shoes and continued walking. Defendant then ordered one of 
her two white male companions to take the witness' shoes. The witness observed one of the 
males pull a fixed blade hunting style knife from behind his back and hold it toward the witness. 
While threatening the witness with the knife, the male said, "Give her your shoes." The witness 
ran from the scene and the male chased her a short distance before running away. The witness 
thought she observed all three suspects leave the scene headed westbound on 300 South. Based 
on the witness1 observation and interaction with Defendant, she was able to describe Defendant to 
police as a black female approximately 5*6" tall, with short, curly black hair. 
While the witness was giving the above information to Officer Degraw, Officer Boelter 
observed Defendant in an alley no more than fifty feet east of the scene. Officer Boelter contacted 
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officer Degraw and together they approached Defendant as she exited the alley. Officer Degraw 
noted that Defendant matched the description given by the witness, so he took Defendant to the 
witness for a showup. The witness positively identified Defendant as the woman who had 
demanded her shoes only minutes earlier. 
ARGUMENT 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND OF EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE 
The Due Process clauses of both the Utah and Federal constitutions prohibit the use of 
unreliable eyewitness identification evidence to obtain a conviction. State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 
1232, 1236 (Utah App. 1° 5); Neil v. Biggers, 93 S.Ct. 375, 382 (1972). However, the Utah 
Supreme Court has interpreted the state constitution as requiring a more demanding analysis than 
the federal constitution for determining whether an eyewitness identification is reliable. State v. 
Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986). This is because the Utah Supreme Court, in its own view, 
places more stock in scientific studies that lead inexorably to the conclusion that human 
perception is inexact and that human memory is limited and fragile. Id at 488. To prohibit 
identification of an accused based solely upon the faulty recollection of an eyewitness—and 
thereby risk a conviction that violates an accused due process under article I, section 7 of the 
Utah Constitution-Utah courts must conduct an in-depth appraisal of the reliability of eyewitness 
identification testimony before admitting such evidence. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 780 
(Utah 1991). 
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In Ramirez, the Court laid out five factors a judge must consider when determining 
whether eyewitness identification is reliable: 
(1) [T]the opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the 
event; (2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time 
of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to observe the event, 
including his or her physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the 
witness's identification was made spontaneously and remained 
consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion; 
and (5) the nature of the event being observed and the likelihood 
that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it correctly 
This last area includes such factors as whether the event was an 
ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time it was 
observed, and whether the race of the actor was the same as the 
observer's * 
Ramirez, at 781 (citations omitted). If the judge finds the identification reliable in light of these 
five factors, then the identification evidence is admissible under both the state and federal 
constitutions. Id. at 784 ("[0]ur article I, section 7 analysis is certainly as stringent as, if not more 
stringent than, the federal analysis [therefore] we see no need to perform a separate Biggers 
federal analysis.") 
In some cases, however, the judge may suspect that the witness' identification of the 
defendant is unreliable under factor (4) of the Ramirez analysis because the state conducted a 
1
 The United States Supreme Court's reliability factors focus significantly less on the witness* ability to perceive 
the event and accurately recall it: 
[Tjhe opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, 
the witness* degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness* prior description 
of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the 
confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. 
Neil v. Biggers, 93 S.Ct 375, 382 (1972). 
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lineup, showup, or photo array in a manner suggesting the witness should select defendant. When 
the defendant alleges the state has employed such suggestive procedures, the court must 
determine if the procedures "give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification." State v. Thamer, 111 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1989). If the court so holds, the 
appropriate remedy is to suppress evidence relating to that identification. Simmons v. United 
States, 88 S.Ct. 967, 971 (1968). However, the witness may still make an in court identification 
of the defendant if, under the totality of the circumstances, the witness' own experience with the 
defendant provides a reliable basis for identifying the defendant that is independent of the 
suggestive state procedure. State v. Gurule, 856 P.2d 377, 380 (Utah App. 1993); Thamer, 111 
P.2d at 435 (Utah 1989)(holding that if out of court identification procedure is impermissibly 
suggestive, then in court identification must based on untainted, independent foundation). The 
State bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that its witness' own 
experience with the defendant provides a reliable independent basis for the in court identification. 
Gurule, at 381. 
B. THE WITNESS' IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT 
AT THE SHOWUP WAS RELIABLE. 
As discussed in section A, above, this Court should suppress the witness' identification of 
Defendant at the showup only if it finds that identification to be unreliable. But under the five-
factored Ramirez analysis, the witness1 identification of Defendant at the showup was wholly 
reliable. Each of these factors will discussed independently below. 
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L The Witness' Opportunity to View the Defendant During the Event. 
The Ramirez court articulated a list of considerations to guide a judge's analysis of this 
first factor. These include 
the length of time the witness viewed the actor; the distance 
between the witness and the actor; whether the witness could view 
the actor's face; the lighting or lack of it; whether there were 
distracting noises or activity during the observation; and any other 
circumstances affecting the witness's opportunity to observe the 
actor. 
Ramirez at 782. 
The witness did not indicate how long she observed Defendant. However, the encounter 
was of sufficient duration for Defendant to notice the witness' shoes, demand them, and order one 
of her companions to seize them. The witness' report to police indicates the encounter took place 
in fairly close quarters, presumably on the sidewalk as the witness walked within several feet of 
Defendant. The short distance between the witness and Defendant permitted Defendant to 
observe the shoes on the witness feet in sufficient detail to desire them. Moreover, if there was 
adequate lighting for Defendant to perceive the witness' shoes in detail, then the witness could 
likewise have notice the Defendant's physical characteristics. There is no evidence that there were 
distracting noises or activity that interfered with the witness' observation of Defendant. 
2. The Witness'Degree of Attention to Defendant 
The witness was alone as she walked toward and past the Defendant. She was not 
engaged in conversation or otherwise distracted by any companions. She was simply walking 
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toward her apartment when she noticed Defendant and her two male accomplices. While the 
witness may not ordinarily have paid much attention to the Defendant, Defendant initiated 
conversation with the witness. Defendant compelled the witness* attention by making an 
unequivocal demand for the witness' shoes. Although the witness did not respond to the demand, 
the witness was focused on Defendant given the hostile nature of the exchange. Thus, the witness 
had a high degree of attention to Defendant. 
J. The Witness' Capacity to Observe Defendant During the Event 
The Ramirez court offered the following considerations to guide the judge in 
consideration of this factor: 
Here, relevant circumstances include whether the witness's capacity 
to observe was impaired by stress or fright at the time of the 
observation, by personal motivations, biases, or prejudices, by 
uncorrected visual defects, or by fatigue, injury, drugs, or alcohol. 
Id. at 783 (citations omitted). 
The witness may well have been frightened by Defendant's demand for her shoes. Her 
fright would undoubtedly have increased when one of the male accomplices pulled a knife and 
repeated the demand. However, the witness' fear did not disable her or otherwise inhibit the 
normal operation of her senses. When the knife-wielding accomplice approached her, the witness 
ran to her apartment and called the police. Thus, even though the witness was probably very 
frightened by the episode, her senses were functioning well enough to allow her to run to her 
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apartment and communicate her distress to the police. If her hearing or vision were substantially 
disabled by fear, she could not have performed her escape and plea for help. 
Finally, there is no evidence that the witness1 perception of Defendant that night was 
impaired by personal motivation, biases, prejudices, uncorrected visual defects, fatigue, injury, 
drugs or alcohol. 
4. Spontaneity and Consistency of Witness9 Identification and 
Whether it was the Product of Suggestion. 
The relevant Ramirez considerations of this factor include the 
length of time of the event and the identification of the defendant; 
the witness's mental capacity and state of mind at the time of the 
identification; the witness's exposure to opinions, description, 
identifications, or other information from other sources; instances 
when the witness or other eyewitness to the event failed to identify 
defendant; instances when the witness or other eyewitness gave a 
description of the actor that is inconsistent with defendant; and the 
circumstances under which defendant was presented to the witness 
for identification. 
Ramirez at 783. 
With respect to the timing of the descriptions given by the witness, her initial description 
was given to the responding officers only minutes after the incident. Thus, the elapsed time was 
minimal. Between the incident and the description, the witness did not see or hear anyone else 
describe Defendant. Her description to police was spontaneous and based wholly on her own 
recollection. 
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The witness' description was consistent with the Defendant's appearance. When 
the police noticed Defendant in an alley no more than fifty feet from the scene, they brought her 
for a showup . Officer Degraw's police report specifically states he brought Defendant for a 
showup because she "fit what description the victim was able to give me." Thus, Officer Degraw 
recognized that the witness' description of Defendant was entirely consistent with Defendant's 
actual appearance. Aside from any agitation the witness may have felt from seeing Defendant in 
person at the showup, there is no evidence to indicate the witness' mental capacity and state of 
mind influenced her identification. 
5. The Nature of the Event the Witness Perceived and the Likelihood 
She Would Perceive. Remember, and Relate it Correctly. 
The witness was a victim of an attempted armed robbery. Such events are highly unusual 
and would likely draw the undivided attention of any innocent victim. But the actions and actors 
involved in this armed robbery were not so unusual as to place them outside human perception. 
Defendant and her accomplices stood within the plain view of the witness as she walked by. 
Defendant was not racing by in a speeding automobile. Moreover, Defendant voiced her demand 
in plain English: "Give me your shoes." The witness could not mistake the threatening tone of the 
demand. The danger of the situation was dramatically underscored when the male accomplice 
pulled a knife and repeated the demand. In short, the encounter was clearly dangerous and would 
have left a vivid imprint in the witness' recollection. While it is true that Defendant and the 
witness are of different races, the witness' description of Defendant did not rely upon an ability to 
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perceive the subtle nuances of Defendant's unique physical characteristics Instead, the witness 
described in more general terms the Defendant's race, height, and color and length of hair In light 
of the unusual circumstances of the encounter between Defendant and the witness, it is highly 
probable that the witness could accurately remember and relate that encounter correctly 
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CONCLUSION 
The witness' identification of Defendant at the showup bears all the indicia of reliability 
required under the five-factored Ramirez analysis. The witness observed Defendant from only a 
few feet away under highly unusual circumstances. She suffered no distractions or impairments 
that would preclude her ability to perceive Defendant. Furthermore, the showup was conducted 
with complete impartiality. Defendant was chosen for the showup because she was no more than 
fifty feet from the crime scene and she perfectly matched the witness' description. There is no 
evidence the showup was "suggestive" and Defendant wholly fails to make that argument. Thus, 
the witness' identification is reliable and the State urges the Court to admit evidence of the 
showup identification. 
But even if the Court finds the showup procedure in some way suggestive, the totality of 
the circumstances makes clear that witness has an independent basis upon which to make an in-
court identification of Defendant. Therefore, the witness should be allowed to make an in-court 
identification of Defendant even if the showup identification is suppressed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ££f day of August, 1996 2<rfL
E NEAL/GUNNARSON 
District Attorney 
GERBLAYLOCK 
eputy District Attorney 
0 0 0 (I I 3 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
IDENTIFICATION 
Case No. 961901374FS 
Page 12 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum In Opposition 
To Defendant's Motion To Suppress was mailed/delivered to Richard P. Mauro, Attorney for 
Defendant DIANE MARIE NELSON, 424 East 500 South Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 on the °°1 day of August, 1996. 
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SALT LAKE 
the matter 
961901374. 
suppress i 
concerning 
here on be 
the state. 
CITY, UTAH; OCTOBER 9, 1996; A.M 
THE COURT: You may be seated. 
of State versus Diane Marie Nel 
This is in connection with the 
dentification of the eye witness 
bond, as I understand 
half of the defendant, 
You may proceed. 
MR. MAURO: Yes, Your 
it. Mr. 
Mr. Blayl 
. SESSION 
We're here in 
son, it's 
motion to 
, and 
Mauro, you're 
ock's here for 
Honor. In talking to 
Mr. Blaylock, I believe there's a bit of a 
had filed 
testimony, 
a notice of intent to : 
and I filed that in a 
included Dr. Dodd, who's present 
curriculum 
him put to 
September. 
vitae. 
rely on ex 
problem. I 
pert 
timely manner, and I 
here, I included his 
I had intended to meet with Dr. 
gether a report sometime around 
I have, through my f< ault, not 
Dodd and have 
the end of 
had an 
opportunity to do that, or meet with him today. I have 
provided to Mr. Blaylock a different repor 
that I bel ieve that Dr. Dodd has 
has not, in conformance with the 
report that relates specifically 
Mr. Blaylo 
wrong—he 
testified 
statute, 
t of the areas 
about, but he 
prepared a 
to this case. 
I think, in terms of the—if I 
ck correctly, and he can correct 
was going to be submitting the p 
understand 
me if I'm 
reliminary 
< • ( < . : u | 
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hearing transcript as 
Ramirez that this was 
procedure. 
We were go 
and have Dr. Dodd tes 
that would impact or 
part of their isasis to argue under 
not a suggestive show-up 
ing to take parts of the transcript 
tify about the different factors 
go into the eye witness 
identification procedure, and then ask him some 
questions about the reliability of that procedure under 
the facts and circumstances of this case. 
So that's 
believe Mr. Blaylock' 
evidence. He indicat 
kind of where we're at. I don't 
s going to be presenting any other 
ed that he, based upon the report, 
he may want to hire an expert of his own, and contradict 
some of the things. 
THE COURT: 
that. And as far as 
probably entitled to 
those things he'll be 
But that is- -
And I think he's entitled to do 
I'm concerned, I think Mr. Dodd is 
give an opinion. I suspect that 
attesting to are the same things 
that are covered in the Long instruction. 
MR. MAUR0: 
THE COURT: 
you Mr. Mauro, unless 
here, it's an issue o 
witness ID is reliabl 
They are. 
And frankly, I'll be honest with 
there's something highly unusual, 
f fact as to whether or not the eye 
e. Dr. Dodd can certainly say what 
he thinks, but he's not the finder of fact, the jury 
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would be. 
So 
the jury, and 
what I'd be inclined to do is let it go to 
not suppress the identification, give the 
Long instruction, let Dr. Dodd testify, let the state 
call an expert 
But 
want to put it 
if they wish to. 
I'm happy to hear testimony today if you 
on. What I'd suggest you may want to do 
is make a proffer, and I suspect Mr. Blaylock may accept 
it and the court may accept it. 
MR. 
do that. 
THE 
objection to p 
MR. 
have, and the 
that because I 
Dr. Dodd that 
facts of this 
circumstances, 
address those 
basically, we 
hearing. 
So 
that we were m 
MAURO: Okay. I think I could probably 
COURT: Mr. Blaylock, do you have any 
roceeding in that manner? 
BLAYLOCK: Your Honor, the concern that I 
concern that I expressed to counsel, was 
did not have a copy of a report from 
related specifically to this case, the 
case, that he would be relying on, the 
it makes it very difficult for me to 
specific issues and to know what, 
wanted to present in this kind of a 
I indicated to Mr. Mauro that I thought 
laybe a little premature on that, having 
the hearing now, putting on testimony now, since I 
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haven't had that opportunity. 
The second thing was that, as an 
accommodation- -
THE COURT: But my question was, do you 
oppose proceeding in the manner I indicated? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: I think it would- - Well, 
putting on testimony now puts me at a disadvantage, 
because I don't know what Dr. Dodd's going to say with 
regards to this specific- -
THE COURT: I don't think you heard me, 
Mr. Blaylock. I didn't talk about testimony, I talked 
about a proffer. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Well, the court said first 
testimony, and indicated that counsel may desire to 
shorten that by making a proffer of what that testimony 
would be. 
THE COURT: Are you going to put on the 
witness or offer a proffer, Mr. Mauro? 
MR. MAURO: It may be, and I'm thinking about 
that as I'm standing here. It may be more appropriate 
to put Dr. Dodd on briefly, only because I think he can 
better explain the—and I don't know if they're 
necessarily scientific issues--but there are certainly 
issues that relate to State versus Long and State versus 
Ramirez. 
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THE COURT: I think they're accepted. I 
understand why you would need to put him on for a jury, 
or why you believe you would. But I'm willing to give a 
Long instruction, I've heard this sort of thing before, 
I'm aware that eye witness testimony can be incorrect, 
and there are many factors that contribute to how 
reliable it is. 
Let me ask this, Mr. Blaylock. Did you get 
his notice on September 24th? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: I got a notice of his intent 
to rely on this witness as an expert, yes. Now, my 
understanding of the statute is that it requires also 
that, in addition to that, a report be submitted to 
counsel so counsel knows what the substance of that 
testimony would be, and basically what amounts to a 
proffer of what that witness will be testifying to. 
THE COURT: If that's your only objection, I 
deny it. Because frankly, it's very clear what his 
testimony would be from the notice itself. So the 
defense intends to call Dr. David H. Dodd from the 
University of Utah Department of Psychology to present 
testimony relative to eye witness testimony. That's 
basically what he'd be saying, Mr. Mauro; is that 
correct? 
MR. MAURO: That's correct, Your Honor. 
0 0 016 5 
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THE COURT: If it went beyond that, I'd 
understand your objection. But 
he'd be attest. 
Mr. Blaylock. 
Lng to. 
If you 
over, I suppose. 
MR. 
You didn 
want addi 
BLAYLOCK: That' 
Your Honor. What I'm saying is 
with each specific case because 
circumstances . 
THE 
Mr. Blaylock? 
MR. 
reoort from Mr 
THE 
MR. 
in each 
COURT: 
case. 
Are you 
BLAYLOCK: I wou 
. Dodd# 
COURT: 
MAURO: 
Dr. Dodd. 
Has he p 
He can p 
it's clear that's what 
't file an objection, 
tional time we can set it 
s not what I'm saying, 
that testimony varies 
there are different 
asking for more time, 
Id just like to see a 
repared a report? 
repare a report. I've 
met with himf unfortunately today's the first time I met 
with him. I think Dr. 
How quickly? 
DR. 
THE 
DODD: 
COURT: 
Dodd could prepare a report in- -
A day. 
I don't 
a report unless one exists, Mr. 
entitled to is 
If you want to 
to know what the 
have him put on 
that's what I'm trying to find 
giving you leave to have him re 
think you're entitled to 
Blaylock. What you're 
witness would attest to. 
the stand today, and 
out, we can do that, 
-called at a later time. 
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Or you can wait, if Mr. Mauro is acquiescing in your 
request for a report. What are you asking to do? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Well, whether or not I cross 
examine him depends upon what information is provided. 
If counsel makes a proffer- - What I'm saying is, I 
know generally what he's going to testify to. In this 
case specifically I don't know what he would say. I 
don't know what he would say with regards to how tainted 
some eye witness identification may be because of 
contacts, and that's- -
THE COURT: That's the purpose of cross 
examination and examination. So again, my question is, 
do you want him put on the stand today, or do you want 
additional time? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Well, and again, this isn't my 
motion, it's counsel's motion. If he feels it's 
necessary for him to make the case that he wants to, I 
guess now is the time, and he has the witness here, and 
rather than waste the time he could put him on. 
THE COURT: This court, since there is no 
objection based upon timeliness, is going to allow 
Dr. Dodd to testify at the time of trial. Assuming 
foundation can be laid consistent with the curriculum 
vitae, I would allow the witness to be called at trial 
to testify to the general unreliability, or the factors 
0 0 0167 
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that lead to unreliability in eye witness testimony. 
Given my ruling, I don't think you can gain 
anything by putting him on, Mr. Mauro. I guess 
Mr. Blaylock has the option of calling him if he wishes 
to. 
MR. MAURO: That's fine, Your Honor. I just 
wanted to indicate, just so that you're aware, what I 
had Dr. Dodd do was review the preliminary hearing 
transcript. He could testify about, and I think as this 
court is aware, there are three stages of eye witness 
identification analysis: The acquisition, the 
retention, and the retrieval. 
And perhaps you're right. I mean, when I 
read Ramirez, we certainly run into the problem of 
whether that goes to the weight or whether that goes to 
the various issues that- - Whether it goes to weight or 
whether the court, on the front end, can make some kind 
of legal analysis about the reliability. That is what 
we had intended to do, and that was the purpose of the 
motion. 
I think you are correct, however, that 
Dr. Dodd is essentially going to describe the factors in 
Long, describe the factors in Ramirez, and talk about 
how those apply to the individual specifics of this 
case. He will express concern about the darkness, the 
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shortness of the period of time, and the observation, 
the cross-cultural issue, and he will express concern 
about the identification that occurred in this case, 
which, as I'm sure the court is aware, a show-up 
procedure, where she was handcuffed in front of a patrol 
car. 
THE COURT: Right. And again, either side 
can argue this with or without testimony. But absent 
any further information that persuades me, I'm inclined 
to allow the identification to stand, to deny the motion 
to suppress, but to instruct the jury fully on the issue 
of eye witness identification pursuant to Long, to allow 
the state to call a witness on eye witness 
identification of their own if they wish to. That 
witness would need to be designated fairly quickly, 
because the trial is set for November 4th. How much 
time do you need, Mr. Blaylock? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: I need some time to talk to 
Dr. Dodd and see specifically what he's going to say 
with regards to the facts of this case. I would need at 
least- - We're set on the 4th of November, aren't we? 
If I could have ten days. 
THE COURT: Ten days from today would put it 
at the 18th. That's the day of the pretrial. I'll make 
it until the 17th at 5:00 o'clock. That way your expert 
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needs to be identified 
If there's 
that time. 
available 
courtroom 
generate a 
to—Mr. Bl 
hours of y 
issue, and 
an offer to 
by the time we have our pretrial. 
be made, it needs to be made by 
Is there anything furtherf Mr. Mauro? 
MR. MAURO: No. And certainly Dr. Dodd is 
today to talk to Mr. Blaylock. 
THE COURT: 
and able to 
report--and 
aylock is en 
our getting 
MR. MAURO: 
THE COURT: 
MR. MAURO: 
So noted. He's seated in the 
be interviewed. If he does 
I understand he's going 
titled to that within twenty-four 
it, Mr. Mauro. 
And I will send that to him. 
All right, any other issues? 
The only other issue was the bond 
I can update the court. The last time that 
we were here we talked 
program. 
Salvation 
know much 
other than 
I think sh 
at this po 
about Diane's entry into a 
And I had discussed with the court the 
Army program , and I understand, and I don't 
about the women's Salvation Army program, 
it's brand 
e's number 1 
int. 
new. She is on the waiting list, 
or number 2 on the waiting list 
I don't have much information to give the 
court about what they 
facilities 
the men's 
do, or what kind of treatment 
they have there. I'm sure it's similar to 
program. 
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THE 
is. 
MR. 
a drug case. 
THE 
MR. 
on- - She may 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
MAURO: 
COURT: 
MAURO: 
Let me ask you what her record 
Judge, I represent Ms. Nelson on 
Another pending case? 
No, no. It's a case that she's 
be on probation right now. 
COURT: 
MAURO: 
court, or Division II 
THE 
THE 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
THE 
THE 
COURT: 
To whom? J 
It's a judge in the circuit 
• 1 
Do you know who it is? 
DEFENDANT: A Dever. 
COURT: 
MAURO: 
COURT: 
MAURO: 
COURT: 
MAURO: 
COURT: 
And what is the charge? 
A class A misdemeanor. 
Reduced from a third? 
Reduced from a third, I believe. 
Possession? 
I believe it is possession. 
And what drug? 
DEFENDANT: Cocaine. 
COURT: And when did that occur? When 
did they allege you possessed- -
THE 
THE 
probation? 
DEFENDANT: About a year ago. 
COURT: And when were you put on 
0 0 0 171 
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THE DEFENDANT: At that time. 
THE COURT: A year ago? 
THE DEFENDANT: About a year ago now. 
MR. MAURO: It was about a year ago, Your 
Honor, as I recall. 
THE COURT: So she was clearly on probation 
when this alleged crime occurred; is that correct? 
MR. MAURO: She was. 
THE COURT: Are there any failures to appear 
in her record, or any other crimes? 
MR. MAURO: Judge, there are some other 
crimes, and I know most of them because we have been 
through this with Judge Dever, are suostance abuse 
related. And I know I'd represented to the court on a 
prior occasion, it's clear to me that Diane is very 
bright and very knowledgeable but for her drug problem. 
THE COURT: Does she have other felony 
convictions? 
MR. MAURO: I don't think she does. I see on 
her record that I have here that they look to be mostly 
DUI, possession cases, things like that. Paraphernalia 
cases. 
I know for a long period of time that she 
owned her own business here in Salt Lake City, she has 
two children that are now in the care of her husband, I 
0 0 017 2 
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believe. She is divorced, her two children are thirteen 
years old, they're both twins, 
she played a significant role 
It's clear to me that 
in the raising of those 
children until she developed this drug problem. 
She lost her business, she lost 
other things in her life. I think this is 
period of time that she has spent in jail. 
somewhat of an eye-opener for 
opportunity to straighten out, 
that she's dried out from the 
been living on the street for 
her, she's h< 
, at least to 
use of drugs 
a long perio< 
I think she's had a lot of time to think. 
She's corresponded 
frequently, and I think I see 
problem is, and her situation 
with me in 1< 
some insight 
r and why she 
the problems that's not only caused for he 
problems it's causing for her children. 
Her children are teenagers now, 
lived without a mother for a significant p 
a lot of 
the longest 
It's been 
ad an 
the extent 
She's not 
a of time, and 
etters quite 
into what her 
's here, and 
r, but the 
they have 
eriod of time. 
Both because Ms. Nelson has made that choice, the wrong 
choice, by not reuniting with 
her drug problem, and now she 
her children 
gets a real 
think about the potential destruction she' 
because she's not there to raise her child 
because of 
opportunity to 
s caused, 
ren, and to be 
with her children, in the significantly formative years 
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of her life. 
As I've ind 
for the drug problem, 
icated, it's clear to me that, but 
she is very bright, very 
intelligent, she's very aware of what's going on. I 
talked to her and have discussions with her about the 
case that are quite insightful in terms of where she's 
coming from. 
THE COURT: 
program? 
MR. MAURO: 
But why the Salvation Army 
That is the only program right 
now, the community-based program that doesn't require 
payment. I don't know 
THE COURT: 
MR. MAURO: 
with Odyssey House is. 
THE COURT: 
MR. MAURO: 
she's been interviewed 
THE COURT: 
Odyssey House, Ms. Nel 
what the- -
What about Odyssey House? 
I don't know what the situation 
They don't require payment. 
That's right, and I don't know if 
by them or not. 
Are you willing to go into 
son? 
THE DEFENDANT: The way I see it, Odyssey 
House sets people up f 
THE COURT: 
or failure. 
The answer to that is no? 
THE DEFENDANT: That's not the answer. I've 
applied for Odyssey House, although I've been waiting 
0 0 017 4 
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since I've gone in jail the 1st of July, I've been J 
waiting for an answer back 
answer back from them. 
THE 
from them. We don't have an 
COURT: What do you mean, they set people 
up for failure? 
THE DEFENDANT: 
go to that program and run 
THE 
the problem? 
THE 
COURT: And 
DEFENDANT: 
There's a lot of people that 
it. I understand- -
you think the program creates 
I think, but perhaps the 
program might be part of the problem, yeah. J 
THE COURT: You 
addiction is the problem? 
THE DEFENDANT: 
don't think maybe drug 
Don't misunderstand me. You 
know, I'm aware of my issues, I'm aware what a lengthy 
program would have to offer- -
THE COURT: I've gotten your answer, but 
thank you for that guidance. Mr. Blaylock, what is your 
position? 
MR. 
wants to enter 
make an effort 
BLAYLOCK: The State's position is if she 
Odyssey House and be serious about it and 
there, we have no objection to her being 
released to Odyssey House. That would make a difference 
as to how we dispose of this case ultimately, also. 
THE COURT: Has she got any failures to 
00 0175 
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appear, or any record other than what Mr. Mauro has 
indicated? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Your Honor, the record that I 
have—these are historically inaccurate as far as 
reporting back—I show eleven arrests, four convictions, 
two of those convictions deal with controlled 
substances. There are additional arrests for retail 
theft. I don't show failures to appear, though. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Mauro, anything else 
you'd like to say? 
MR. MAURO: Just that, Judge, I can't recall, 
I don't believe we had failures to appear in the other 
case, but I don't have an independent memory of that. 
THE COURT: I'll accept your representation. 
My concern, Mr. Mauro, is that I think the Salvation 
Army program is fine for some people who do not have 
significant problems with substance abuse. It is not a 
great program, in my opinion, for people who have a 
significant problem. And I'm not willing to release her 
to that program. 
If she's serious about treatment and wants a 
long-term program, I think, as Mr. Blaylock points out, 
it may well impact the disposition of the case. It 
certainly would impact my willingness to let her out. 
But given that she apparently has mixed feelings about 
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that, 
wrong 
long 
I'm not. 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MAURO: 
COURT: 
MAURO: 
i 
Okay, Your Honor, thank you. 
Did you have something else? 
No, Your Honor. 
DEFENDANT: I believe that you got me 
I believe that 
time, it's going 1 
Salvation Army 
of my 
THE 
THE 
program 
COURT: 
I've been involved in drugs a I 
to take a lot longer 
. 
That's my point. 
than some I 
DEFENDANT: It's going to take the rest | 
life, and I have 
now my children are in 
treatment in Arizona, \ 
here, 
with 
have 
until 
It's 
the s 
not j 
as per the court 
my kids a: 
THE 
a serious 
that is ] 
as simple 
fter- -
COURT: 
crimina 
resolved 
as that 
treet, that would 
ust going 
is behind you. 
prote 
want. 
My ( 
to buy < 
concern, 
ct the community, 
And I am not sa 
to live that day by 
Arizona. I wish to 
day. Right 
go into 
spend whatever time I have to 
, but I'd like to be in Arizona 
That's not in the cards. You 
1 matter pending, Ms 
, you will not be in 
. Nelson. And 
Arizona. 
And I'm not putting you out on 
set you up to fail. And you're 
a ticket to Arizona and think this 
Ms. Nelson, is that 
as well as consider 
I need to 
what you 
tisfied that I can protect the 
o o o 1 7 ; 
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community unless you're 
drug treatment program. 
If that's not 
really not what you want 
should we kid ourselves? 
in a tough, long-term, serious 
what you want—and that's 
, is what I'm hearing—then why \ 
If you didn't do this crime, 
that will come out at the trial, and then you're free to 
do whatever you wish to. 
will also be determined, 
appropriate in terms of 
comfortable with your be 
serious program. Anythi 
If you did do it, then that 
and then we'll look at what's 
punishment. But I'm not 
ing out unless you're in a 
ng further? 
MR. MAURO: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Motion for reduction of bond is 
denied. We have a trial date, and as far as I can tell 
that looks like a good one, and we'll consider it a 
first place setting and a go. 
For that reason I will hold you to the 
deadlines that I've set 
anything further at this 
MR. BLAYLOCK: 
on the other things. Is there 
time? Mr. Blaylock? 
The only other thing that we 
kind of need to get resolved between us is the 
transcript. As an accommodation between our office and 
legal defenders' office, 
their typed-up version. 
what we normally do is accept 
I haven't had the opportunity, 
or had the tape to compare the tape to that transcript. 
0 0 0 1 7 » 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
21 
I anticipate d< 
tape available 
THE 
Ding that. Mr. 
to me today. 
Mauro said he'd make that j 
COURT: Mr. Mauro, can I ask you to do 
that? How long do you need? 
MR. MAURO: My secretary is no longer at the 
office, so I hope I can find 
not, I'll have 
Mr. Blaylock's 
THE 
left permanent: 
MR. 
California, un: 
California. 
THE 
do this? Mr. ] 
it copied and 
office. 
COURT: She's 
Ly? 
the copy of the tape. If 
send it over to 
left for the day, or she's 
MAURO: Her husband got a good job in 
fortunately for us, and she's gone to 
COURT: All right. Well, why don't you 
Blaylock, is there someone at your office 
who could transcribe it? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: It1 's transcribed. I just need 
to listen to the tape and look at the transcription. 
THE 
MR. 
tape, if he'll 
people over at 
copy in a fair. 
THE 
COURT: So it1 
BLAYLOCK: If 
's getting the tape. 
Mr. Mauro can't find the 
let me know then I'll get hold of the 
the Division I, and they can make me a 
Ly short time. 
COURT: Let's 
that, Mr. Mauro. Let's say, 
give you an a deadline on 
why don't we give you 
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until- - I'd like to expedite it. Can you have it to 
him by Friday, the 11th? 
MR, MAURO: Sure. I called my secretary, if 
she has the tape I'll send it over to him this 
afternoon. 
THE COURT: Okay, great. Anything else we 
need to cover today? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: I don't believe so. 
MR. MAURO: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, gentlemen. That'll 
take care of this one, then. 
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not form an opinion, continue to keep an open mind, 
don't allow anyone to discuss it with you or in your 
presence. 
I'm going to ask you to remain on this floor, 
and Mr. Hellewell will show you out. 
(The jury left the courtroom) 
THE COURT: All right, counsel, let me 
indicate we're still in court, and I think we 
this rather quickly. Let me hand each side a 
can handle 
copy of 
the court's stocks. Let me tell you that I have then 
taken your instructions and integrated them in, and I'm 
going to discuss with you how I've done that, 
you should be able to merge your instructions 
I've got. 
and then 
with what 
Most of what has been offered by the defense 
is stock. Let me go through. The court's first eleven, 
twelve instructions are all stock instructions. The 
twelfth instruction is offered in two different ways. 
One, if the defendant takes the stand, one if the 
defendant does not. Both of them need to reflect female 
pronouns, et cetera, and that can be done. 
But let me ask you, your plan, Mr. 
not to have the defendant take the stand? 
MR. MAURO: I don't believe so. I 
talked about that with her, but- -
Mauro, is 
haven't 
0 00S5S 
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take the 
THE COURT: 
MR. MAURO: 
witness stand 
THE COURT: 
Why i 
Judg 
• 
All 
to her her right to take th 
so, the : 
negative 
But she 1 
and tell 
correct? 
to her a 
fact that no one wi 
inferences from it 
understands sh< 
her story, or 
MR. MAURO: 
THE COURT: 
MR. MAURO: 
B has 
the 
That 
All 
And 
don't you do that now? I 
e, Ms. Nelson is not going to 
right, and you've explained 
e stand if she chooses to do 
11 comment on it or draw any 
if she does not testify. 
both the right to testify 
right not to; is that j 
's correct. 
right. 
for the record, I have spoken 
couple of times, most recently of which was 
last night at the jail 
there ta 
the long* 
packets, 
testify. 
specific 
Lking to her. 
THE COURT: 
er instruction 
which is the < 
, and 
All 
that 
spent a couple of hours down 
right. So we will utilize 
's numbered 12 in your 
Dne where if she chooses not to 
And I'll make the 
for the defendant. 
Next instruction 
is one that's at the back o 
forward, it's the one, it's 
defendant in this action is 
changes to make it gender 
that you should put in place 
f my packet that I'm moving 
unnumbered, it begins, "The 
a member of the blank race." 
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I'm going to change that so it reads, "The 
defendant in this action is African American," and it 
goes on to say, "The fact of the defendant's race should 
not be construed to her detriment or in her favor." 
On the last two lines it talks about creed or 
color, and that's changed so it will read, "regardless 
of race, religion, ethnicity and gender, comma, is 
entitled to the same protection under the law." I'm 
assuming there's no objection to that being given. It 
appears appropriate. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: No, Judge. 
THE COURT: The next one is 13, which is 
reasonable doubt. I'm giving that instead of 
Mr. Mauro's requested reasonable doubt instruction. 
The next one is one that was submitted by the 
state, it was their number 5 in the packet. It begins 
"To constitute the crime charged in the information, 
there must be the joint operation of two essential 
elements." Any objection to that? 
MR. MAURO: Is that next in the- -
THE COURT: I'll put that in after reasonable 
doubt. It was the plaintiff's number 5 in terms of the 
order of their instructions. We'll make you a set of 
these. 
MR. MAURO: Okay. 
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THE COURT: 
defines conduct, act, 
really. 
MR. MAURO: 
Any objection to th at? It 
omission, talks about mens rea, 
I think I may have 
objection to that, but let me look and see 
their packet? 
THE COURT: 
but if you count down 
constitute the 
MR. 
Uh-huh. Theirs are 
I think it was 
crime charged." 
MAURO: 
five. 
I think that's fine 
sure they're all applicable. I'm not sure 
applicable. 
THE 
deleted? 
MR. 
COURT: 
MAURO: 
relates to this case. 
THE COURT: 
could argue that if a 
He can delete 
Sure. I just 
it. 
don't 
On the other hand, 
man was giving 
she, in failing to stop him, engaged 
conduct, if you will. Mr. Blaylock, 
theory in defining that, as well? 
MR. 
THE 
because there . 
find a certain 
chase 
had an 1 
. It's 5 in 
unnumbered, 
"To 
I'm not 
omission is 
Do you want it 
think it 
I suppose one 
with a knife, 
in omissive type 
was that your 
BLAYLOCK: That was one of 
COURT: I'm going to . 
is an instruction here 
set of 
Leave 
that 
circumstances not to 
the theories. 
it as it is, 
says "If you 
apply, 
0CGSG1 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
174 
disregard it." 
The next one is from the state's packet, it 
was number 7 in order, 
acting with the mental 
of the offense, who di: 
and it begins, "Every person 
state required for the commission 
rectly commits the act, who 
solicits, requests, commands, et cetera." I think we 
need that one, 
MR. 
had given me? 
THE 
MR. 
now. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
it's your aiding and abetting language. 
MAURO: 
Maybe I 
COURT: 
MAURO: 
COURT: 
MAURO: 
COURT: 
into place at this poi] 
renumbered, and it beg 
mental state required. 
aiding and abetting. 
The 
integrate here, 
Those were in the packet that you 
'm just- -
I don't think I gave it to you. 
You're going through his packet 
I'm integrating his into mine. 
I understand now. 
So what was his number 7 falls 
nt in ours. And it'll be 
ins, "Every person acting with the 
'• It's basically a stock for 
next one was also the state's that we 
and it 
than one person who is 
begins, "Although there is more 
involved in this incident, the 
case against each person is separate and independent 
from the case of the other.11 It seems appropriate and 
I'm inclined to give it. 
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this last 
that that 
yourselves 
defendant 
they have 
other peop 
see. 
sentence? 
MR. MAURO: 
week in our 
The only- -
homicide case, 
And I talked about 
The only part of 
I'm concerned about is the last sentence. j 
THE COURT: "You are not to concern 
; with the status of any other person or 
involved in 
MR. MAURO: 
to concern 
)le. There 
THE COURT: 
MR. MAURO: 
this incident, • i 
Because I think, to some extent, 
themselves with the conduct of the 
is an argument to be made- -
Well, how about with- - Let's 
Why not just delete the last 
MR. BLAYLOCK: It says "status." I think 
that clearly defines 
defendant. 
THE COURT: 
parentheses- - I'm g 
that last sentence, " 
other person, however 
it. It's not the actions of the 
I'm going to 
oing to add up 
put in 
at the beginning of 
You may consider the actions of the 
, you are not to concern yourselves 
with the status of any other person 
they've been charged, 
cetera." 
Mr. Mauro. 
We'll retyp 
Does that 
vis-a-vis whether 
how they've been sentenced, et 
e it. I think that's a good point, 
satisfy your concern on that? 
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MR. MAURO: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. The next one is from 
the plaintiff's packet, or the state's packet, it was 
their number 10, it says, "Under the law of the state of 
Utah, robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of 
personal property." Don't you need an attempt in there, 
Mr. Blaylock? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: I do, and I just realized 
that. That's not an accurate statement of the law. Or 
attempted taking is what it should be. The intentional 
taking or attempted taking of personal property. 
THE COURT: Well, is a robbery- - I think a 
robbery requires the taking. An aggravated robbery can 
include an attempt robbery. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Well, Your Honor, the statute 
that was amended in 1995- -
THE COURT: To encompass- - So we don't have 
an attempted robbery any more? Robbery is a taking or 
an attempted taking? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Attempted robbery is now a 
legal fiction. What it now says is, lfA person commits 
robbery if the person unlawfully and intentionally takes 
or attempts to take personal property in the possession 
of another.11 That's the present language. 
THE COURT: All right. So we would insert 
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"intentional taking or attempted taking of personal 
property in the possession of another." And 
need to add that down below, don't you? "In 
of committing robbery or attempted robbery." 
want to add it down there? 
then you 
the course 
Do you 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Maybe I'm looking at a 
different instruction. 
THE COURT: No, we're on the same 
instruction, it's number 10. It has two different 
sentences. What I'm saying, it seems to me, to be 
cautious you'd want to add "or attempted robbery" in the 
second sentence, as well. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: That defines aggravated 
robbery. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Aggravated robbery 
course of committing robbery, and robbery is 
is in the 
an attempt. 
THE COURT: To be on the safe side, you may 
want to say "or attempted robbery." 
MR. BLAYLOCK: That would be fine 
court wants to add that. 
1 
if the 
THE COURT: Do you have any objection to 
that, Mr. Mauro? 
MR. MAURO: I don't believe I do. 
just maybe take a quick look at the statute. 
If I could 
Put it in 
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for now, and then I can raise it- - I guess you want to 
have it typed now, though. 
THE COURT: I'm going to have it typed, but 
I'm relatively certain this is the law. So you're 
welcome to look. 
Let's go over these, and then you can take a 
look at it. The next one in the order is the elements 
instruction that was offered by the state. I think it's 
11 in terms of the order of what they offered. It 
begins, "Before you can convict the defendant, Diane 
Marie Nelson, of the offense of aggravated robbery." Do 
you have any problem with this one? 
MR. BLAYL0CK: Your Honor, I did- -
THE COURT: I substituted the one that has 
"attempt" in it. Is that what you mean? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: No, I submitted two other 
ones, one of them being a lesser included offense. If 
they find it was not with a dangerous weapon- -
THE COURT: I didn't see that. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: I submitted those to her 
just- -
THE COURT: Well, but they were not lesser 
includeds, were they? They were just- - They had the 
attempt language. Which is not a lesser any more. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Robbery would be a lesser 
00 0360 
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included o 
robbery? 
have we? 
that would 
"If you do 
robbery- -
your subst 
f an 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
aggravated robbery. 
COURT: You're asking for a 
BLAYLOCK: Yes. 
COURT: We haven't gotten t 
BLAYLOCK: But this is the 
be effective. Because at the e 
not 
ti 
THE 
find all of the elements of 
COURT: That's what I said. 
ituted one here. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: It says, "If you 
simple 
o that yet, 
instruction 
nd it says, 
aggravated 
I've got 
do not find 
all the elements, then you must consider the question of 
robbery." 
THE COURT: What it says is, it 
"Before you can convict the defendant of a 
robbery," 
paragraph 
convinced 
that' 
begins with, 
ggravated 
rs the opening paragraph. The last 
is, "If, on the other hand, you 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then 
are not 
you must 
consider the guilt or innocence of the defendant with 
respect to 
anticipati 
robbery, a lesser included." 
MR. 
THE 
ng. 
BLAYLOCK: Exactly, I apolo 
COURT: That's all right, y 
That's the substituted one 
gize. 
ou were 
from the 
o o o o G ; 
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state. And then there are elements for that, as well. 
"Before you can convict the defendant, Diane 
Marie Nelson, < 
included,11 so 4 
new ones that < 
of the offense of robbery, a lesser | 
that would go in, and these are the two 
came in today. 
Then the next one begins, is definitional, 
and it begins, "'Unlawful' means that which is contrary 
to law, or unauthorized by law." Any objection to that, 
Mr. Mauro? It 
MR. 
need it, but I 
THE 
define "unlawfi 
The 
definitional. 
item capable o 
or a facsimile 
was their 12. 
MAURO: No. I mean I don't know if we 
guess I don't object to it. 
COURT: Okay. I think we need it to 
ul. " 
next one was their 13, and it is 
It begins, "'Dangerous weapon' means any 
f causing death or serious bodily injury, 
or representation of the item." Any 
objection to that? It also defines attempt. It's a 
one-page instruction. j 
MR. MAURO: No. Do we need serious bodily 
injury in there? 
THE 
find it exists 
MR. 
MR. 
COURT: Perhaps not, but if they don't 
, they don't need to consider it. 
MAURO: That's fine. 
BLAYLOCK: What that refers to is what 
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the dangerous weapon is capable of doing. Causing death 
or serious bodily injury. 
THE COURT: Okay. The next one is one of the 
court's stocks, again, it's from kind of the back of the 
packet, but we'd insert it here, I propose. It begins, 
"The intent with which an act is done denotes a state of 
mind and connotes a purpose in so acting." I think the 
state asked for one like this, or the defense did, as 
well. Any problem with that one? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: The state has no objection. 
MR. MAURO: I'd like to check, but I don't 
think I have a legal basis to do that, so 3 will hold my 
objection. 
THE COURT: All right. And the next one is 
one that the state offered as their number 2, it begins, 
"Intent and motive should never be confused. Motive is 
what prompts a person to act or fail to act, intent 
refers to the state of mind with which an act is done or 
omitted." Any objection to that? 
MR. MAURO: No. 
THE COURT: All right. Then I would suggest 
we insert the defendant's requested Long instruction, 
which is three and a quarter pages long. I have done a 
shorter version of it, but I'm not going to offer mine. 
I'll go ahead and read this in its entirety if, even if 
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there's an objection. 
substitute, and I don1 
but- -
defense 
it. No 
Unless the state wants to off 
t think you have that, do you? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Well, I have a substitute, 
THE COURT: Do you have any problem with 
offered Long instruction? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: No, other than the length 
• 
THE COURT: 
rer a 
• 1 
the 
of 
I'm going to give it. And the 
next one is the defense-requested one, "You cannot 
convict the defendant 
speculations, however 
with th: 
on mere possibility, surmises or 
strong they may be." Any problem 
Ls? It is their number 9. 
The last line is, "Where there are two 
possible explanations for the conduct of the defendant 
by one explanation, the defendant would not be 
responsible." You're 
you, Mr 
really not entitled to this, are 
• Mauro? Because your theory of the case is 
that she was behaving 
case is it wasn't her. 
MR. MAURO: 
appropriately. Your theory of 
That is certainly the theory 
the case. What we did discuss in opening, however, 
certainly if there was, indeed, a woman there, her 
conduct 
a valid 
wasn't rising 
argument to ma 
to the level. And I think the 
ike, that she's merely present 
1) (r (r L ( 
not 
» the 
of 
is 
sre's 
at 
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the scene, possibly, 
THE COURT: Well, you can argue that, but it 
seems to me that there are not two possible explanations 
for the conduct of the defendant under your theory of 
the case. 
MR. MAURO: No, I think you're correct. Our 
primary argument is the identification procedures. 
THE COURT: Do you object to this, 
Mr. Blaylock? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: For those reasons, yes. 
THE COURT: All right, I'm not going to give 
it. I had considered giving it, but I'm not going to. 
The defendant also did not take the stand, or 
as I understand it, is not taking the stand to offer an 
alternative theory of what occurred, so for that reason 
also it's inappropriate. Unless something changes. 
The next one is the defense offered, it 
begins, "In determining whether an accused is criminally 
responsible for an act committed by another, the degree 
of his responsibility is determined by his own mental 
state." Any problem with this, Mr. Blaylock? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: No. I believe that, however, 
is reflected in the state's already given parties 
instruction. It says, "Everyone acting with the mental 
state required by law." I think this is superfluous. 
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one? 
THE 
MR. 
submitted this 
COURT: 
MAURO: 
out of 
State versus Krick. 
want 
THE 
it. 
MR. 
THE 
intoxication. 
not going to. 
It's 
at a 
COURT; 
MAURO: 
COURT: 
Are you satisfied with the other 
The reason I submitted this, I 
a trial I had, it's right out of 
I'm inclined to give it if you 
Okay. 
Okay, the next one 
You haven't raised that. I 
The state offered it. I'll 
not appropriate under these facts. 
Next one is the court's stock, 
verdict in this 
consider the subject 
any ] 
ways 
give 
The 
is voluntary 
assume you're 
pull it out. 
"In arriving 
case you shall not discuss nor 
of penalty or punishment." 
next one is, "If, in these instructions, 
rule, direction or idea has been stated in varying 
.
ff
 The next one 
you instructions 
may become necessary 
The 
defendant both 
each 
tt T h e 
juror." 
And 
is, "The court has endeavored to 
embodying all rules 
in guiding you." 
next one is, "The state of 
are entitled the individual 
last one is, or excuse me, 
attitude and conduct of jurors at the 
of law that 
Utah and the 
opinion of 
next to last, 
outset of 
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their deliberations are a matter of considerable 
importance." 
And 
your verdict.11 
included in it 
opposing the g 
MR. 
Because they- « 
finally 
But th 
, and I 
iving of 
MAURO: 
, "When you retire to consider J 
is does not have the lesser 
guess needs to have it. Are you 
a lesser included? 
Well, you know, I think I would. 
I mean they believe that she should be 
charged with the aggravated robbery. That's what's been 
charged. I do] 
included is. 
THE 
n't know 
COURT: 
what the basis for the lesser 
If they find the weapon was not 
utilized, or not utilized by her, I suppose. I 
MR. 
cases, there's 
state to offer 
obviously, is • 
MAURO: 
certain 
And under Baker and the other 
ly a different standard for the 
a lesser included. And the reason being, 
they hav 
go through, and they h 
e the screening process that they 
ave the other things that they do. 
I wouldn't object if they were to amend it down to a 
second-degree 
second-degree 
THE 
Mr. Mauro. 
MR. 
felony a 
felony. 
COURT: 
MAURO: 
lesser included being 
nd it went to the jury as a 
Well, that's good of you, 
I would object, however, to the 
submitted. I don't believe that 
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they have a basis for doing that. 
THE COURT: It seems to me that under the 
testimony, and what I understand the remaining testimony 
to be, we've either got a, "She didn't do it, somebody 
else did,1* or we've got, "She did it." But it's not a 
"she committed robbery," because if they find the 
witnesses credible enough to convict, then the testimony 
had to do with a weapon, and it becomes an ag robbery. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: The question is, what was her 
mental state? What did she intend? And I think to not 
allow us to submit the lesser included takes away from 
us the argument that, "Okay, if she did not intend that 
he use a knife, she certainly did intend that he commit 
a robbery, an attempted robbery." 
And I would suggest to the court that, based 
upon the evidence that we have, I think both are 
appropriate, and the jury has facts upon which either 
could be found. And that's the test for determining j 
whether or not a lesser included offense instruction is 
appropriate. 
THE COURT: Mr. Mauro? 
MR. MAURO: You know, and it sort of leads me 
to the next argument I wanted to make before the jury 
comes in, and that would be an argument, obviously, that 
the state has not shown a prima facie case. If they 
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don't believe that she committed an aggravated robbery, 
i.e. that she didn't have the knife, that she didn't J 
encourage the use of the knife or intend to use the 1 
knife, then this, as an alternative to that, then this 
simply ought to go to the jury as a robbery. 
What the state is saying, "Well, the evidence 
is unclear. We'll concede that ourselves by submitting 
the instruction." And you heard the testimony. She 
never had a knife or touched a knife or transferred a 
knife or did anything with the knife. It was the other 
person. 
THE COURT: It's co-defendant liability that 
we're talking about. 
MR. MAURO: Right. 
THE COURT: The state has the option of 
charging it either way. You're right, they make the 
call up front. But it seems to me that if the jury were 
to believe all but the knife vis-a-vis this witness- -
But you don't have a robbery unless you have a threat. 
To take something, or threatening conduct, to take 
something from the immediate person or presence of 
another, and you don't have that. There's no threat 
except the knife. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Well, there is a threat. 
THE COURT: What is it? 
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MR. BLAYLOCK: The threat is, "She's wearing 
shoes, get those shoes for me." How else does he get 
the shoes other than by taking them by force? I mean 
you don't go over and say- -
THE COURT: But there's no expression of, 
"I'll beat you to a pulp," or, "Give me those shoes or 
I'll hit you." I've just answered your own record, but 
I'm not giving a lesser. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: If this court doesn't allow me 
to give it, we don't take appeals from these kinds of 
issues, but- -
THE COURT: Well, what guides me, hopefully, 
is what's right, not whether or not it's going to be 
appealed. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: I understand that. But Your 
Honor, the position is, was she going to voluntarily 
give up the shoes? Obviously not. Force or fear, being 
chased- - Even if you take the knife away, okay? 
THE COURT: But the witness testified that 
the fear was as a result of the weapon. The witness 
testified that the mechanism to get the shoes from 
her- - Nobody tried grabbing them off her or anything. 
The mechanism was the weapon. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: But the argument is, "I 
intended for him to get the shoes from her because of 
c (• o s'; G 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
189 
the way I dire 
a knife." So 
him to get the 
authority or a 
THE 
cted him, 
the jury 
I didn't intend for him to use 
could find that she intended for 
shoes, but he exceeded, basically, her 
gency by 
COURT: 
using the knife. 1 
You're not going to argue that, 
are you, Mr. Mauro? Because I think Mr. Blaylock's 
correct. If that's the argument that's going to be 
made- - First 
because there' 
something othe 
of all, 
s nobody 
there's nothing to support it, 
who's testified that she intended 
r than the use of a knife. She's not 
taking the stand, as I 
So 
inappropriate 
it? 
MR. 
it seems 
to argue 
MAURO: 
some notes, and I didn 
THE 
Mr. Blaylock? 
MR. 
already kind o 
was the man. 
she intended f 
intend for him 
THE 
intended. She 
COURT: 
understand it. 
to me that it would be 
that. That isn't your plan, is 
I'm sorry, I was writing down 
ft hear exactly what that was. 
Do you want to repeat it, 
BLAYLOCK: I believe that counsel's 
f prefigured this argument by saying it 
It was not the woman. The argument is, 
or him to get the shoes, but she did not 
to use the knife to get the shoes. 
COURT: It doesn't matter what she 
intended to have him get them for her, 
0 (• I Z\\ 
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and then he engages in this conduct. She has solicited, 
encouraged it. She doesn't need to know he's going to 
pull out a knife. She merely needs to be present for it 
and to have solicited it or encouraged it or aided and 
assisted in any other way. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: But I don't think that's clear 
to the jury when the jury is also- -
THE COURT: Then argue it. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: That the mental state doesn't 
go to the use of a specific weapon. The mental state 
goes to the commission of the crime. 
THE COURT: Well, you'll have to argue it. 
And you're entitled to. But I guess my feeling is that 
a lesser included is not appropriate. It would also be 
inappropriate for you to argue what she did as being 
less than. You can argue generically, I suppose. But 
don't go very far down that road or I'll stop you, okay? 
MR. MAURO: I don't think I have- - I don't 
think I did in opening. 
THE COURT: You have nothing to support it. 
MR. MAURO: I mean, I think I've made the 
argument already that we would make. 
THE COURT: And that argument is? 
MR. MAURO: Well, we said it in opening, that 
it's an interesting case, and even if you look at the 
0 0 0 3 "< ^  
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conduct| 
crime? 
witness 
r and the question, is, is the conduct even a 
Which is what we had already argued. 
The conduct is a crime, if the jury finds the 
is credible, it is a crime to take somebody's 
shoes, or threaten to 
even if 
she was 
conduct, 
she isn't the 
the one there 
take them at knife point. And 
one with the knife, if they find 
soliciting, encouraging the 
then it's aggravated robbery under the 
elements. 
THE COURT: 
the other instruction 
robbery 
I'm going to have to substitute 
now. The first robbery, ag 
instruction that was given that does not have 
the lesser included language. 
You made a valiant shot at it, Roger, but I'm 
inclined to think that, as Mr. Mauro points out, I've 
created 
courts, 
an issue for you on appeal with our appellate 
where you're asking for it versus the defense. 
Under these facts- -
defense handles this, 
But I'm going to watch how the 
and you're not going to walk over 
that line and argue that. So that's where we are on 
that. 
break. 
down to 
Okay, remove the lessers, take a five-minute 
Dig up your witness, and I'm going to take these 
be typed. 
MR. MAURO: And you'll get us a fresh copy of 
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MR. BLrrLOCK: That the mental 
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THE COURT: 
And you're entitled to 
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But I guess my f 
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less than. You can argue generically, I 
don't gz very far down 
MR. MAURO: 
think I did in opening 
THE COURT: 
MR. MAURO: 
argument already that 
THE COURT: 
MR. MAURO: 
that road or I'll 
has solicited, 
he's going to 
present for it 
or aided and 
nk that's clear 
state doesn't 
mental state 
to argue it. 
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conduct, 
crime? 
witness 
and the guest 
Which is what 
The conduct 
ion, is, is the conduct even a 
we had already argued. 
is a crime, if the jury finds the 
is credible, it is a crime to take somebody's 
shoes, or threaten to 
even if 
she was 
conductt 
she isn't the 
the one there 
then it's agg 
elements. 
THE COURT: 
the other instruction 
robbery instruction th 
the lesser included la 
You made a 
inclined to think that 
created 
courts, 
an issue for y 
take them at knife point. And 
one with the knife, if they find 
soliciting, encouraging the 
ravated robbery under the 
I'm going to have to substitute 
now. The first robbery, ag 
at was given that does not have 
nguage. 
valiant shot at it, Roger, but I'm 
, as Mr. Mauro points out, I've 
ou on appeal with our appellate 
where you're asking for it versus the defense. 
Under these facts- -
defense handles this, 
But I'm going to watch how the 
and you're not going to walk over 
that line and argue that. So that's where we are on 
that. 
break. 
down to 
Okay, remove the lessers, take a five-minute 
Dig up your wi 
be typed. 
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tness, and I'm going to take these 
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0 C C o 7 y 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
192 
those? 
forward 
called 
having 
as foil 
THE 
MR. 
(Br. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
to be J 
(Th< 
COURT: 
MAURO: 
Yeah. 
Thank you. 
ief recess) 
COURT: 
MAURO: 
COURT: 
sworn. ] 
Mr. Mauro, you're ready? 
Yes, we are, Your Honor. 
Let's have your witness come 
Bring in the jury. 
s jury entered the courtroom) 
DR. DAVID DODD 
as a witness by 
been first duly 
ows: 
THE 
gentlemen, did 
discuss 
opinion 
did not 
believe 
motion 
COURT: 
you all 
the case, even 
and on behalf of the Defendant, 
sworn, was examined and testified 
You may be seated. Ladies and 
bear in mind my admonition not to 
with one another, not to form an 
, but to keep an open mind? Is there anyone who 
? No hands are 
MR. 
, just : 
that I . 
THE 
MAURO: 
for the ] 
intended 
COURT: 
raised. You may continue. 
Thank you, Your Honor. And I 
record, that we had discussed a 
, but I had made that argument- -
And you can reserve your right to 
make that. You did allude to your argument. 
MR. MAURO: Thank you, Your Honor. For the 
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Addendum E 
INSTRUCTION NO. V\ 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of the offense who directly commits the offense, who 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids 
another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense 
shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
0 (K* 1 0 ;> 
INSTRUCTION NO.
 1 °i 
Under the law of the State of Utah, robbery is the unlawful 
and intentional taking or attempted taking of personal property in 
the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, 
against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear. A person 
commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, 
or attempted robbery, that person uses or threatens to use a 
dangerous weapon; or causes serious bodily injury upon another. 
0 0 0 i 0 i 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Diane Marie Nelson, of 
the offense of Aggravated Robbery as charged in the information, 
you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable 
doubt each and every one of the following elements of that 
offense: 
1. That on or about the 1st day of July, 1996, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the defendant, Diane Marie Nelson, as a 
party, took or attempted to take personal property then in the 
possession of Amy Brown, from the person or immediate presence of 
Amy Brown; and 
2. That such taking or attempted taking was unlawful; and 
3. That such taking or attempted taking was intentional; and 
4. That such taking or attempted taking was against the will 
of Amy Brown; and 
5. That such taking or attempted taking was accomplished by 
means of force or fear; and 
6. That in the course of committing such taking, or 
attempted taking dangerous weapon was used. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this 
case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one of the 
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find 
the defendant guilty of Aggravated Robbery as charged in the 
information. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, 
then you must find the defendant not guilty. 
000108 
INSTRUCTION NO. «2 \ 
"Unlawful11 means that which is contrary to law or 
unauthorized by law, or, without legal justification, or, 
illegal. 
A person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a 
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
"Personal property" mean anything of value, and includes 
shoes. 
0 0 0 1 0 0 
INSTRUCTION NO. prc* 
"Dangerous weapon" means any item capable of causing death 
or serious bodily injury, or a facsimile or representation of the 
item, and: 
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended use of 
the item leads the victim to reasonably believe the 
item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; 
or 
(b) the actor represents to the victim verbally 
or in any other manner that the actor is in control of 
such an item. 
"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or 
causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or 
creates a substantial risk of death. 
An act shall be considered to be "in the course of 
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, 
during the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the 
attempt or commission of a robbery. 
An attempt occurs if a person is acting with the kind of 
culpability otherwise required for the commission of an offense 
and engages in conduct constituting a substantial step towards 
commission of the offense. 
Conduct does not constitute a substantial step unless it is 
strongly corroborative of the personfs intent to commit the 
offense. 
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Addendum F 
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 76-2-202 
PART 2 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCT OF 
ANOTHER 
76-2-201. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Agent" means any director, officer, employee, or other person 
authorized to act in behalf of a corporation or association. 
(2) "High managerial agent" means: 
(a) A partner in a partnership; 
(b) An officer of a corporation or association; 
(c) An agent of a corporation or association who has duties of such 
responsibility that his conduct reasonably may be assumed to repre-
sent the policy of the corporation or association. 
(3) "Corporation" means all organizations required by the laws of this 
state or any other state to obtain a certificate of authority, a certificate of 
incorporation, or other form of registration to transact business as a 
corporation within this state or any other state and shall include domestic, 
foreign, profit and nonprofit corporations, but shall not include a corpora-
tion sole, as such term is used in Title 16, Chapter 7, Utah Code Annotated 
1953. Lack of an appropriate certificate of authority, incorporation, or 
other form of registration shall be no defense when such organization 
conducted its business in a manner as to appear to have lawful corporate 
existence. 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-201, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-201. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note, Utah's Statute Am. Jur. 2d. — 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes 
Permitting Limits on Corporate Directors' Lia- § 224. 
bility: A Guide for Lawyers and Directors, 1988 C.J.S. — 22 C. J.S. Criminal Law 5 127. 
Utah L. Rev. 847. Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *=» 1,13. 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission 
of offense or for conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an 
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
History: C. 1963, 76-2-202, enacted by L. Wildlife Resources Code, j 23-20-23. 
1973, ch. 196,1 76-2-202. Obstructing justice, J 76-8-306. 
CroM-Referencee. — Aiding violation of 
27 
76-6-301 CRIMINAL CODE 52 
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters or remains on 
property as to which notice against entering is given by: 
(i) personal communication to the actor by the owner or someone 
with apparent authority to act for the owner; 
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude intrud-
ers; 
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention of 
intruders. 
(3) (a) A violation of Subsection (2Xa) is a class C misdemeanor unless it 
was committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) A violation of Subsection (2Kb) is an infraction. 
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the: 
(a) property was open to the public when the actor entered or remained; 
and 
(b) actor's conduct did not substantially interfere with the owner's use 
of the property. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-206, enacted by L. present code citation for ''Subsection 78-11-
1973, ch. 196, t 76-6-206; 1974, ch. 32, < 15; 20(2)" in Subsection (2XaXi) 
1992, ch. 14, i 2; 1996, ch. 142, 8 3. Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amend- meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301 
ment, effective April 29, 1996, substituted the 
PART 3 
ROBBERY 
76-6-301. Robbery. 
(1) A person commits robbery if 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or 
immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immedi-
ate force against another in the course of committing a theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it 
occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate 
flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
History: C. 1963, 76-6-801, enacted by L. in the possession of another from his person, or 
1973, ch. 196, { 76-6-901; 1996, ch. 222, f 1. immediate presence, against his will, accom-
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- pushed by means of force or fear," added Sub-
ment, effective May 1, 1995, rewrote Subsec- section (2), and redesignated former Subsection 
tion (1), which had read "Robbery is the unlaw- (2) as (3). 
ful and intentional taking of personal property 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Included offense. 
Proof of the elements of aggravated burglary 
will never prove all the elements of aggravated 
robbery, therefore, one is not a lesser included 
offense of the other State v Brooks, 278 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 5 (Utah 1995). 
76-6-302 CRIMINAL CODE 
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defen-
dant's conduct constituted a "substantial step" 
toward commission of the offense and that the 
substantial step must be "strongly corrobora-
tive" of defendant's intent to commit the offense 
was reversible error State v Harmon, 712 P2d 
291 (Utah 1986) 
Evidence. 
—Sufficiency. 
Possession of stolen property alone was not 
sufficient to sustain conviction for robbery, but 
its quality as evidence was of such high degree 
that even slight corroborative proof of other 
inculpatory circumstances would warrant con-
viction of felony murder based on intent to rob 
State v Boyland, 27 Utah 2d 268, 495 P2d 315 
(1972) 
Evidence was sufficient to support defen-
dant's conviction for robbery See State v 
Uhbam, 668 P2d 568 (Utah 1983) (theft from 
convenience store) 
—Testimony. 
In prosecution for robbery based on defen-
dant's alleged act of taking mone> from person 
and presence of another, where defense was 
that, if defendant actually was guilty of the act, 
he took money under claim of ownership and in 
honest belief that he had nght to it, defendant 
had the right to testify as to his intent, belief, 
and motive at time of alleged robbery, it was 
error for trial court to refuse to permit him to 
answer question, asked while he *as testifying 
in his own behalf, as to whether at time when 
he allegedly took the money, he honestly be-
lieved money was his and that he had a nght to 
take it People v Hughes, 11 Utah 100, 39 P 
492 (1895) 
Intent. 
In determining whether the defendant had 
an intent to commit robber>, the jury was 
entitled to resort to reasonable inferences 
based upon an examination of all the surround-
ing circumstances State v Gutierrez, 714 P 2d 
295 (Utah 1986) 
Taking of property. 
Defendant who, at gunpoint, demanded 
money from cashier of motel and then after 
picking up money turned to walk out of motel 
but was seized near doorway, subdued and 
forced to drop the money had sufficiently 
asportated the money to complete the cnme of 
robbery, escape to place of temporary safet> 
was not necessary to completion of cnme State 
v Roberts, 30 Utah 2d 407, 518 P2d 1246 
(1974) 
Threats. 
Where the victim was not misled by the use of 
a firearm or a facsimile thereof, but rather b> 
defendant's threatening words and gestures 
while this certainly satisfies the elements of 
robbery which must be accomplished by means 
of force and fear, a second-degree felony, it does 
not satisf} the elements of aggravated robber> 
State v Sunmlle, 741 P2d 961 (Utah 1987) 
(reducing conviction to robber} and remanding 
for resentencing) 
Cited m State v Morrell 803 P2d 292 (Utah 
Ct App 1990), State v Adams, 830 P2d 310 
(Utah Ct App 1992), State v Germonto, 868 
P2d 50 (Utah 1993), Parsons v Barnes, 871 
P2d 516 (Utah 1994) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 67 Am Jur 2d Robbery § 1 
C.J.S. - 77 C J S Robbery § 3 
AXJL — Earlier prosecution for offense dur-
ing which homicide was committed as bar to 
prosecution for homicide, 11 A L R 3d 834 
Purse snatching as robbery or theft, 42 
A L R 3d 1361 
Prosecution for robbery of one Derson as bar 
to subsequent prosecution for robbery of an-
other person committed at the same time, 51 
A L R 3d 693 
Key Numbers. — Robbery *» 1 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
188 
OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 76-6-302 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-302, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-302; 1975, ch. 51, § 1; 
1989, ch. 170, § 7; 1994, ch. 271, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective May 2, 1994, added Subsection 
(1X0. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Elements of offense. 
Entrapment defense unavailable. 
Evidence. 
— Insufficient. 
—Prior convictions. 
—Sufficient. 
Eyewitness identification. 
Included offense. 
Indictment or information. 
Intent. 
Recent possession of stolen property. 
Recovery of property by force. 
Sentence. 
—Use of a firearm. 
Threatening to use weapon. 
Unloaded firearm. 
Cited. 
Elements of offense. 
In prosecution for robbery with revolver, 
based on defendant's alleged act of taking 
money from another, where defense was that, if 
defendant actually was guilty of the act, he took 
money under claim of ownership and in honest 
belief that he had right to it as result of card 
game, it was error for court to give instruction 
whereby jury was authorized to convict defen-
dant notwithstanding absence of felonious in-
tent. People v. Hughes, 11 Utah 100, 39 P. 492 
(1895). 
All essential elements were proved where 
evidence showed defendant took $120 on March 
10 though charged with taking $140 on March 
9, and where the victim testified the defendant 
had a gun stuck in the front of his jeans but 
evidence did not show defendant handled or 
pointed a gun and the gun was not found after 
the robbery. The date charged need only be 
closely proximated, the value of personal prop-
erty taken is not an element of robbery, and 
proof that the gun was actually pointed and 
placing the gun in evidence are not necessary 
since if mere exhibition of a gun places the 
victim in fear it constitutes "use of a firearm." 
In re R.G.B., 597 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1979). 
Proof of all elements necessary to prove a 
robbery is not required; so long as there is an 
attempt, coupled with the use of a firearm, 
knife, facsimile thereof, or another deadly 
weapon, or the accused causes serious bodily 
injury, the elements of aggravated robbery are 
satisfied. State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 
1988); State v. Hickman, 779 P2d 670 (1989). 
Entrapment defense unavailable. 
Defendant, charged with aggravated robbery 
under Subsection (l)(a), was not entitled to the 
defense of entrapment, because the threat of 
bodily injury, which precludes entrapment, was 
a necessarily implied element of the offense 
charged. State v. Colonna, 766 P2d 1062 (Utah 
1988). 
Evidence. 
—Insufficient. 
Defendant's conviction was reversed, because 
the circumstantial evidence connecting him to 
his alleged accomplice and the crime was insuf-
ficient to prove that he was with the accomplice 
during or immediately after the robbery or that 
he had the requisite mental state for the crime 
with which he was charged. State v. Kalisz, 735 
P.2d 60 (Utah 1987). 
Defendant's menacing gesture accompanied 
by verbal threats was not sufficient evidence 
alone to establish the use of a firearm or a 
facsimile of a firearm. State v. Suniville, 741 
P2d 961 (Utah 1987). 
—Prior convictions. 
Admission of evidence of defendant's previ-
ous convictions for burglary and robbery was 
prejudicial error, where the evidence of his guilt 
was far from overwhelming and one of the 
identification witnesses was involved in the 
robbery and had questionable motives for iden-
tifying defendant. State v. Lanier, 778 P2d 9 
(Utah 1989). 
—Sufficient. 
Positive identification of defendant and his 
clothing by robbery victim, and defendant's 
fresh thumb print on a poster which defendant 
had handled while in the place he robbed, 
sustained trial court's finding of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In re R.G.B., 597 P.2d 1333 
(Utah 1979). 
Evidence supported conviction of defendant 
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